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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FLOURISHING FORTIES AGAINST FLAMING FIFTIES: IS
REVERSE AGE DISCRIMINATION ACTIONABLE UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT?1

I. INTRODUCTION
On February 5, 2001, twenty-eight-year-old Stacey Stillman, one of the
castaways from the popular television series “Survivor,” filed a lawsuit
claiming that the producer rigged the show by encouraging other cast members
to vote her off the island.2 She further claimed that the producer’s motivation
was to ensure that the only senior citizen left on the island—crusty seventytwo-year-old Rudy Boesch—would continue to participate in the show.3
Stillman’s claim was regarded as highly unusual, and it provoked joking
commentary in newspapers and on television, as well as a lawsuit directed
back at Stillman. It seemed preposterous at the time that a young and attractive
woman could be discriminated against in favor of an old man, and have a
viable claim. Now, in 2003, this idea does not appear as bizarre. Change the
scenario a little: add just twelve years to Stillman’s age, presume there is no
restrictive employment contract and that no charges of fraudulent interference
with the show are involved—and voila! You now have a cognizable age
discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA),4 at least according to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.5
Specifically, a defendant-employer may now be found liable for reverse age
discrimination.
“Reverse discrimination” is the term that has been coined by the courts to
refer to discrimination in favor of a minority group against a majority.6
1. The labels “flourishing forties” and “flaming fifties” were assigned to different
generational cohorts by Gail Sheehy, the author of the acclaimed book New Passages. See GAIL
SHEEHY, NEW PASSAGES: MAPPING YOUR LIFE ACROSS TIME 24 (1995).
2. See ‘Survivor’ Castoff, Producers Wash into Court, 12 NO. 11 ANDREWS SPORTS &
ENT. LITIG. REP. 11 (2001).
3. Editorial, Bits and Pieces, WINSTON-SALEM J., Feb. 10, 2001, at 16, available at 2001
WL 3040737.
4. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000)).
5. See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted,
123 S.Ct. 1786 (2003).
6. The term also sometimes refers to “affirmative action,” but often has different meanings
depending on the context in which it is used. See generally Philip L. Fetzer, ‘Reverse
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Reverse discrimination claims brought under federal anti-discrimination laws
have proliferated in the past several years.7 Such claims have been held viable
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)8 when plaintiffs who
are not members of a racial minority sued for discrimination on the basis of
race.9 Similarly, male workers have claimed the protection of Title VII when
discriminated against in favor of women.10
Reverse discrimination has a different connotation when used in the
context of age discrimination claims than it does when used in connection with
race or sex discrimination. According to its terms, the ADEA makes it
unlawful to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”11
The ADEA protects only employees who are forty years old and older.12 As a
result, federal case law appears well settled as far as reverse discrimination
claims of workers under forty are concerned; the plain language of the statute
puts them outside of ADEA protection.13 Unlike reverse race or sex
discrimination that focuses on discrimination against those who historically
have been free from discrimination,14 reverse age discrimination is
discrimination based on relative youth and occurs within a protected class.15 In

Discrimination’: The Political Use of Language, 12 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 212, 216 (1993)
(describing the origins and discussing various definitions of the term ‘reverse discrimination’).
7. See Timothy K. Giordano, Comment, Different Treatment for Non-Minority Plaintiffs
under Title VII: A Call for Modification of the Background Circumstances Test to Ensure That
Separate Is Equal, 49 EMORY L.J. 993, 993 (2000) (stating that the number of reverse
discrimination claims has almost doubled since 1991, constituting 17.1% of the claims filed with
the Equal Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 1996).
8. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255, Title VII, § 703 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000)).
9. John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Reverse Age Discrimination, 210 N.Y. L.J. 3, 3
(1993). See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
10. See, e.g., Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Title
VII lawsuit brought by a male railroad employee alleging that he was denied a promotion to
become a locomotive fireman because of preferences given to black and female employees).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000). It is also unlawful under the ADEA provisions to “limit,
segregate, or classify” employees in a manner that would deprive the employee of “employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee” and “reduce the wage rate
of any employee in order to comply with [the ADEA].” Id. §§ 623(a)(2)–623(a)(3).
12. Id. § 631(a) (stating in pertinent part that “[t]he prohibitions in this chapter shall be
limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age”).
13. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996).
14. See Fetzer, supra note 6, at 216.
15. Jeffrey Paul Fuhrman, Comment, Can Discrimination Law Affect the Imposition of a
Minimum Age Requirement for Employment in the National Basketball Association?, 3 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 585, 600 (2001).
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other words, within the ambit of the ADEA, reverse discrimination refers to
discrimination against the “younger-old” in favor of the “older-old.”
While age discrimination claims have been on the rise in the past several
years,16 litigation based on claims of reverse discrimination has been rare
under the ADEA.17 Until recently, the few federal courts that addressed the
issue of reverse age discrimination under the ADEA refused to extend the
protection of the statute to workers older than forty who alleged discrimination
based on their relative youth.18 The legal landscape changed, however, in June
2002 with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Cline v. General Dynamics Land
Systems, Inc.,19 which found that the ADEA protects workers in their forties
from being treated less favorably than older workers.
This Note will discuss the issue of reverse age discrimination within the
protected class in light of the Cline decision and will address the circuit split
created by Cline. Although the term reverse age discrimination has sometimes
been applied to discrimination against workers under forty,20 this Note will
address only the type of discrimination that affects workers older than forty
who are within the class protected by the ADEA. Part II of the Note will
briefly discuss the language, purpose, and history of the ADEA. Part III will
profile the cases in the current circuit split. Part IV will offer a critical
assessment of recognizing a cause of action for reverse discrimination under
the ADEA and will argue that the text of the ADEA, its goals, and its
legislative history require that a cause of action based on reverse age
discrimination should not be recognized. Part V will examine whether it is
reasonable to recognize reverse discrimination under Title VII while denying it
under the ADEA and will conclude that the courts’ treatment of reverse
discrimination under Title VII is inapposite for the purposes of the ADEA.
Support for this idea will be gleaned from the marked differences between age,

16. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Charge Statistics: FY 1992
Through FY 2001, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last modified Feb. 6, 2003)
(illustrating that ADEA charge filings increased from 18.3% of all discrimination charges filed
with the EEOC in 1999 to 21.5% of charges filed in 2001).
17. See Furfaro & Josephson, supra note 9, at 3.
18. See, e.g., Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 1995); Hamilton v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992); Greer v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., No. 00 CIV 1272 SAS,
2001 WL 137330 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2001); Dittman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 941 F. Supp. 284,
287 (D. Conn. 1996), aff’d, 116 F.3d 465 (2d Cir. 1997); Parker v. Wakelin, 882 F. Supp. 1131
(D. Me. 1995).
19. 296 F.3d at 466.
20. Reverse age discrimination for people younger than forty remains a hot topic for debate
and has been addressed by several commentators. See, e.g., Fuhrman, supra note 15, at 602
(advocating the extension of the ADEA protection to people younger than forty); Bryan B.
Woodruff, Note, Unprotected Until Forty: The Limited Scope of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 73 IND. L.J. 1295, 1295 (1998) (arguing that Congress should prohibit
all age discrimination regardless of the employee’s age).
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sex, and race as protected categories and will be illustrated by Supreme Court
decisions. Public policy considerations that stem from the possibility of
allowing a cause of action for reverse age discrimination will be examined in
Part VI. The Note will conclude that the circuit split should be resolved
against the availability of the cause of action for employees older than forty
claiming reverse age discrimination.
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE ADEA
Before examining the viability of a cause of action for reverse age
discrimination under the ADEA, it is helpful to review the language and the
legislative history of the statute. What follows is a general overview of the
ADEA, which focuses on the portions of the ADEA that are relevant to the
discussion of reverse age discrimination.
A.

The Language of the ADEA

The ADEA applies to private sector employers with twenty or more
employees, labor unions, employment agencies, and the federal government.21
The ADEA’s stated goals are to “promote employment of older persons based
on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment.”22 Under the ADEA,
an employer cannot “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
age.”23 Section 631(a) of the ADEA provides that “any individual” means
those individuals who are at least forty years of age.24
Congress originally designated the protected class as persons between the
ages of forty and sixty-five.25 Rather than imposing a general prohibition on

21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 630(a)–(d), 633(a) (2000). When the ADEA was first enacted, its coverage
was limited to private employment. Subsequent amendments in 1974 and 1978 extended the
ADEA protection to state and federal employees. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a), 88 Stat. 55; Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
23. Id. § 623(a)(1). The ADEA also makes it unlawful to “limit, segregate, or classify”
employees in a manner that would deprive an employee of “employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee” because of the individual’s age. Id. §
623(a)(2). It is also unlawful under the ADEA to “reduce the wage rate of any employee in order
to comply with this chapter.” Id. § 623(a)(3).
24. Id. § 631(a).
25. Id. See DAVID NEUMARK, AGE DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8152, 2001), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8152.
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age discrimination for all ages, Congress later raised the cap to age seventy26
and eliminated the upper age limit altogether in 1986.27 The ADEA provides
four statutory defenses for noncompliance. First, it is permissible for
employers to engage in age discrimination when an employee’s age is a “bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
the particular business.”28 Second, the employer may take action inconsistent
with the ADEA proscriptions in order to comply with a “bona fide seniority
system” or a “bona fide employee benefit plan.”29 Third, the employer may
make discriminatory decisions if “the differentiation is based on reasonable
factors other than age.”30 Fourth, the employer may discharge or discipline for
good cause.31 In addition, the ADEA permits compulsory retirement at age
sixty-five and older for employees who occupy a “bona fide executive” or a
“high policymaking position” under certain circumstances.32
The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (“OWBPA”), which was signed
into law in 1990,33 amended the ADEA and clarified that “‘compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment’ [under the ADEA] encompass
all employee benefits, including [those] provided pursuant to a bona fide
employee benefit plan.”34 The OWBPA also created a series of prerequisites
for knowing and voluntary waivers of ADEA claims and imposed affirmative
duties of disclosure and waiting periods.35
B.

Legislative History of the ADEA

The ADEA was the last of three employment civil rights statutes passed
during the 1960s. It was preceded by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

26. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3,
92 Stat. 189, 189 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2000)).
27. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, §
2(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000)).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
29. Id. § 623(f)(2)(A). The seniority system must not be designed to evade the “purposes”
of the ADEA, thus, no seniority system may impose involuntary retirement. Id.
30. Id. § 623(f)(1).
31. Id. § 623(f)(3).
32. See id. § 631(c)(1).
33. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, §1, 104 Stat. 978 (1990)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 626, 630 (2000)).
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(l) (2000). In addition, the Higher Education Amendments of 1998
allow institutions of higher education to offer voluntary, age-based early retirement to tenured
faculty without violating the ADEA. See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-244, § 941, 112 Stat. 1581, 1834 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(m), (i)(6)
(2000)).
35. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(f)(1)(B), (F)–(G) (2000).
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1964,36 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, national
origin, sex, or religion, and by the Equal Pay Act,37 which prohibits sex
discrimination in wages. Congress began studying the problem of age
discrimination in employment in the 1950s.38 During the debates about the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress considered adding age as a protected class
to be included under Title VII.39 When age discrimination provisions failed to
pass, Congress directed the then Secretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz, to “make a
full and complete study of the factors which might tend to result in
discrimination in employment because of age and of the consequences of such
discrimination on the economy and individuals affected.”40 One of the charges
to Secretary Wirtz was to make a report that would include “recommendations
for legislation to prevent arbitrary discrimination in employment because of
age.”41
Secretary Wirtz delivered his report to Congress on June 30, 1965.42 The
Wirtz Report uncovered substantial evidence of “persistent and widespread use
of age limits in hiring that in a great many cases can be attributed only to
arbitrary discrimination against older workers on the basis of age and
regardless of ability.”43 The main focus of the report was discrimination in
hiring and its effects on unemployment among older adults.44 Secretary Wirtz
found that more than half of all employers applied arbitrary age limits that

36. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2–17 (2000)).
37. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (2000)).
38. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 229 (1983) (discussing legislative history of the
ADEA).
39. See Judith A. McMorrow, Retirement and Worker Choice: Incentives to Retire and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 B.C. L. REV. 347, 347 n.2 (1988) (citing Mayer G.
Freed & Edwina Dowell, The Age of Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 6
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 196, 196 (1972)).
40. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265 (repealed 1966).
41. Id. See generally Alfred W. Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA: Intent or Impact, in
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: A COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR
LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 68, 73–90 (Monte B. Lake ed., 1982) (discussing the
role of Secretary Wirtz’s report in shaping the ADEA).
42. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT (1965) [hereinafter THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER], reprinted in U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 16–41(1981) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
43. THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 42, at 21, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 42, at 37. See also id. at 5 (finding significant evidence of “discrimination
based on unsupported general assumptions about the effect of age on ability—in hiring practices
that take the form of specific age limits applied to older workers as a group”), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 22.
44. Id. at 6–7, 18–19, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 23–24, 35–36.
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were typically set from forty-five to fifty-five years of age,45 that workers over
forty-five represented less than five percent of new hires for most
establishments,46 and that one-fifth of employers hired no workers older than
forty-five at all.47 Secretary Wirtz further found that a “significant proportion”
of the age limits in effect were arbitrary in the sense that they had been
established “without any determination of their actual relevance to job
requirements” and were defended on pretextual grounds.48 The arbitrariness
was underscored by the parallel finding that “[t]he competence and work
performance of older workers are, by any general measures, at least equal to
those of younger workers.”49 The Wirtz Report found that the consequences of
such discrimination “embrace[d] a wide range of production loss, human
hardship, and frustrations” and cost the economy billions of dollars.50
The Wirtz Report also recognized some important differences between
discrimination based on age and other types of discrimination. The report
emphasized that there is no antagonism on anyone’s part toward an older
person.51 Rather, most common forms of discrimination against older workers
involved inaccurate assumptions about the effects of age on their ability to do a
job.52 The Wirtz Report recognized that, unlike with race, “not all
discrimination in [the age] area is ‘arbitrary.’”53 Thus, the Wirtz Report did
not recommend the broad-brush exclusions that are applicable to race
discrimination; it recommended legislation that would eliminate discrimination
based on stereotypes with particular focus on arbitrary age ceilings in hiring.54
For example, in United States v. Florida Board of Regents, the United States
explained:
Between 1965 and 1967, Congress’s two relevant legislative committees and
two select committees on aging conducted 18 days of hearings and compiled a
record [that] consist[ed] of nearly 2100 pages of testimony and evidence

45. Id. at 6, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 23.
46. Id. at 6–7, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 23–24.
47. The OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 42, at 7, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 42, at 24.
48. See id. (emphasis omitted), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 24.
49. Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 25.
50. Id. at 18, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 35.
51. Id. at 2, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 20.
52. THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 42, at 2, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 42, at 20. See Blumrosen, supra note 41, at 79 (stating that “from the
beginning, age discrimination was viewed as a different phenomena from race discrimination—a
phenomena that did not flow from a long history of prejudice and subordination but rather,
flowed from contemporary assumptions that individuals at a certain age lost the capacity to
engage in certain activities”).
53. THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 42, at 1, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 42, at 19.
54. Id. at 21–22, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 37–38.
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[concerning] the problem[s] of age discrimination in employment and the need
for a national legislative response.55

Based on its findings, Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967.56 The ADEA
represents a legislative compromise: the substantive provisions of the ADEA
are derived from Title VII, while the enforcement scheme incorporates the
procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.57 The ADEA provides for
backpay, benefits, reinstatement, and liquidated damages in cases of willful
violations.58 In 1978, amendments to the ADEA “tolled the statute of
limitations for an additional period up to one year, relaxed the notice
requirements of the original Act, and expressly granted jury trials to resolve ‘a
civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable
relief as will effectuate the purposes of the ADEA.”59
Senator Javits, the ADEA’s principal sponsor, emphasized the statute’s
narrow scope.60 “We in America pride ourselves on our free enterprise
system,” he declared, “particularly on the market as the only really objective
test for the acceptance or rejection of the worth of goods or services.”61
Senator Javits explained that the ADEA was designed not to displace market
55. Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
(Nos. 98-796, 98-791). See, e.g., Employment Problems of Older Workers: Hearings Before the
House Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor on H.R. 10634 and
Similar Bills, 89th Cong. (1966); Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings Before the House
Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor on H.R. 3651, H.R. 3768, and
H.R. 4221, 90th Cong. (1967); Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare on S. 830 and S. 788, 90th
Cong. (1967); Retirement and the Individual: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Retirement and the Individual of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 90th Cong. (1967).
56. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-805, at 1 (1967), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
42, at 74.
57. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 626, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2000)). Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000) (ADEA prohibitions), with
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (Title VII prohibitions). 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000) states that the
ADEA “shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures” of fair labor
standards. See also H.R. REP. NO. 90-805, at 5–6 (1967), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 42, at 78–79.
58. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000).
59. Mark J. Wolff, Sex, Race, and Age: Double Discrimination in Torts and Taxes, 78
WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1420 (2000) (quoting Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. § 626(c) (1994)) (footnotes omitted). For information on the 1978 amendments
referenced in the text, see Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-256, § 4 (c), 92 Stat. 189, 191 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (2000))
(extending the statute of limitations); § 4 (b), 92 Stat. at 190 (codified and amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(d) (2000)) (relaxing notice requirements); § 4 (a)(2), 92 Stat. at 190 (codified and amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (2000)) (providing for jury trials).
60. 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at
145.
61. Id., reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 145.
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mechanisms but to counter the “widespread irrational belief that once men and
women are past a certain age they are no longer capable of performing even
some of the most routine jobs.”62
III. CASES IN THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A.

Reverse Age Discrimination Not Actionable: Hamilton v. Caterpillar,
Inc.63

Hamilton was the first judicial interpretation of reverse age discrimination
rendered on the appellate level. Hamilton involved a class action brought
against Caterpillar by a group of employees between the ages of forty and fifty
who alleged that the employer had violated the ADEA by extending early
retirement benefits only to employees fifty and older.64 The employer had
closed two of its plants in Iowa and, as a result of negotiations with the union,
offered a supplemental retirement plan to those employees fifty years and older
who had worked for Caterpillar for ten or more years.65 Hamilton and other
members of his class sued Caterpillar because “they were too young to qualify
for early retirement benefits” and the only basis for their exclusion was their
age.66
The district court dismissed Hamilton’s claim, holding that the ADEA does
not prohibit reverse age discrimination.67 The district court also held that, even
if the ADEA did prohibit reverse discrimination, the special early retirement
program at issue was a bona fide employee benefit plan protected by § 4(f)(2)
of the ADEA.68 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
of the district court based on its review of the first holding that there is no
cause of action for reverse discrimination under the ADEA.69 Judge Cudahy
wrote the Hamilton opinion for the unanimous panel. In the absence of direct
62. Id., reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 145.
63. 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992).
64. Id. at 1227.
65. Id. Caterpillar’s previous pension plan provided early retirement benefits to workers
who were either “60 years or older with 10 years of service and to workers 55 years or older with
terms of service, that, when added to their age, totaled 85.” Id.
66. Id. (emphasis omitted).
67. Id.
68. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(ii) (2000). Furfaro and
Josephson note that “[a]s in effect, at the time plaintiffs’ claims arose, [§ 4(f)(2)] provided
employers a safe harbor from charges of discrimination based on actions taken pursuant to ‘any
bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the ADEA].’ This provision underwent significant revision
in 1990. Section 4(f)(2)(8)(ii) now provides a safe harbor for ‘voluntary early retirement
incentive plan(s) consistent with the relevant purpose or purposes of this chapter.’” Furfaro &
Josephson, supra note 9, at 8 n.4.
69. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228.
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precedent on point, the court relied on dicta from the Seventh Circuit in Karlen
v. City Colleges of Chicago and the First Circuit in Schuler v. Polaroid Corp.
Seventh and First Circuit decisions.70
In the Seventh Circuit case of Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago, the
plaintiffs were three professors who challenged an early retirement program
that was open to faculty members between the ages of fifty-five and sixty-nine
who had been continuously employed full-time for at least ten years.71 The
complaint alleged that the plan violated the ADEA because it provided lower
sick pay for faculty members retiring after age sixty-five and eliminated group
insurance coverage for faculty members retiring after age sixty-five.72 In his
opinion in Karlen, Judge Posner examined the issue of the proper treatment of
early retirement plans under the ADEA and noted that those plans involve
discrimination in favor of, rather than against, older workers.73 Far from being
arbitrary discrimination, such plans give older workers a prized option “only
slightly tarnished by the knowledge that sometimes employers offer it because
they want to ease out older workers.”74
Although the retirement plan in Karlen favored younger employees and the
plaintiffs did not claim reverse discrimination, Judge Posner stated that “an
early retirement plan that treats you better the older you are is not suspect
under the [ADEA].”75 Judge Posner opined that, unlike Title VII, which does
not differentiate within the protected class, the ADEA “does not protect the
young as well as the old, or even, we think, the younger against the older.”76
To further illustrate this point, Judge Posner noted that allowing workers older
than forty but younger than the age of eligibility for early retirement to
challenge Early Retirement Incentive Plans (ERIPs)77 would result in ERIPs
being outlawed, which was not the intent of Congress when adopting the
ADEA.78 Under those circumstances, the employer “could be confident of

70. Id. at 1227.
71. Karlen v. City Colls. of Chi., 837 F.2d 314, 315–16 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1044 (1988).
72. Id. at 316.
73. Id. at 317.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 318.
76. Karlen, 837 F.2d at 318 (emphasis omitted).
77. ERIP is a commonly used acronym for Early Retirement Incentive Plan. ERIPs often
consist of “a one-time lump payment to induce an older worker to retire voluntarily.” Samuel
Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination?: The
ADEA’s Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 814 (1997).
78. Id.
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escaping liability . . . only by allowing retirement at age 40!”79 Such result, in
the words of Judge Posner, would be nothing but “reductio ad absurdum.”80
Another case cited with approval by the Hamilton court was the First
Circuit’s decision in Schuler v. Polaroid Corp.81 Polaroid, during the course of
a workforce reduction, eliminated the position held by the fifty-seven-year-old
plaintiff. The plaintiff accepted the severance plan and retired, but brought a
suit against the employer alleging a violation of the ADEA. The plaintiff
alleged that the employer had forced him to accept the severance package and
leave because of his age.82 Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff’s age
discrimination claim, the court discussed whether a severance plan could serve
as a basis of the plaintiff’s claim.83 The court dismissed the idea that the
plaintiff can “base his ‘age discrimination’ claim upon the attractive terms that
the severance plan offered” because the plan itself was “a carrot, not a stick.”84
The court further stated that the ADEA “does not forbid treating older persons
more generously than others.”85
The Hamilton court began its analysis by pointing out that every court that
ever considered the issue of reverse age discrimination indicated that younger
workers had no cause of action under the ADEA.86 The court disagreed with
the plaintiff’s argument that age discrimination is analogous to race or sex
discrimination and “cuts both ways.”87 The court distinguished race and sex
from age because age is not immutable, nor does it arise from birth.88 The
court found nothing in the legislative history of the ADEA to even suggest that
“Congress believed age to be the equal of youth in the sense that the races and
sexes are deemed to be equal.”89
The next factor examined by the court was the age limit contained in the
ADEA. The court reasoned that, by allowing only individuals forty years or
older to sue under the ADEA, Congress did not intend to prevent reverse

79. Id.
80. Id. Reductio ad absurdum is translated from Latin as “reduction to the absurd,” basically
meaning disproof of an argument by showing that it leads to a ridiculous conclusion. BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1283 (7th ed. 1999).
81. Schuler v. Polaroid Corp., 848 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1988).
82. Id. at 277–78.
83. Id. at 278.
84. Id.
85. Id. (emphasis omitted). The Schuler court found that the plaintiff could not establish a
prima facie case of age discrimination because he was not replaced by a younger person, “rather,
his position was effectively abolished.” Id. See also State Police for Automatic Ret. Ass’n v.
DiFava, 317 F.3d 6, 15 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Schuler with approval for the proposition that the
ADEA allows preferential treatment of older employees).
86. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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discrimination.90 The court considered the EEOC regulations that provide that
“[i]t is unlawful . . . to discriminate . . . by giving preference because of age
between individuals 40 and over.”91 The regulations also offer an example of
prohibited discrimination: if the victim is forty-two years old and his or her
competitor is fifty-two, an employment decision cannot be made on the basis
of either age.92 The court noted that in the only two instances this regulation
had been referenced in case law, it was cited for the proposition that “an older
plaintiff may maintain a cause of action under the ADEA even if his
replacement is over 40.”93 The court concluded that, to the extent that the
EEOC regulation authorizes a cause of action for reverse age discrimination,
“it exceeds the scope of the statute.”94
Turning to the language of the ADEA, the court in Hamilton
acknowledged that phrases like “because of such individual’s age” and “on the
basis of such individual’s age” might be read to prohibit consideration of age
per se in employment decisions.95 However, the court pointed out that
congressional findings that precede the statement of purpose in § 621 “refer
specifically to the problems faced by ‘older workers’ and ‘older persons.’”96
Taking the context and the legislative history of the statute into account, the
court expressed its conviction that Congress was not concerned about the
plight of workers who were discriminated against because they were too
young.97 The crucial feature of age discrimination—the arbitrary denial of
work opportunities on the basis of inaccurate stereotypes—was missing in the
case of younger workers.98 The court compared younger workers to the nonhandicapped, stating that younger workers “cannot argue that they are similarly
victimized.”99
The court’s analysis led it to conclude that Congress could have used
overinclusive language.100 The court suggested that Congress might have used
such phrases as “because such individual is older” or “on the basis of such
90. Id.
91. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (2002) (interpreting
discrimination between individuals protected by the ADEA).
92. Id. (stating that “if two people apply for the same position, and one is 42 and the other
52, the employer may not lawfully turn down either one on the basis of age, but must make such
decision on the basis of some other factor”).
93. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228 (citing LaMontagne v. Am. Convenience Prods., Inc., 750
F.2d 1405, 1411 n.4 (7th Cir. 1984); Miller v. Lyng, 660 F. Supp. 1375, 1377–78 n.2 (D.D.C.
1987)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1228 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 623 (a)(1), (a)(2), (b), (c)(1), (c)(2)).
96. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)).
97. Id.
98. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228.
99. Id.
100. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

FLOURISHING FORTIES AGAINST FLAMING FIFTIES

237

individual’s advancing age,” but had used a more “economical” and “graceful”
language.101 Finally, the court stated that it was “unwilling to open the
floodgates” of litigation attacking every retirement plan and dismissed the
plaintiffs’ complaint.102
Hamilton produced little commentary, and the only criticism focused on
the Hamilton court’s approach to statutory construction.103 Hamilton’s
approach to interpreting the ADEA does seem somewhat result-oriented. In an
opinion that barely exceeds two pages, the court gave little consideration to the
plain language of the ADEA. Instead, the court read the central prohibition of
the statute narrowly, in effect limiting the scope of the ADEA’s application to
discrimination “against older people on the basis of their age.” The court’s
treatment of legislative history is not overly impressive either as the court did
not cite to any specific portions of the congressional record for support of the
proposition that Congress was less concerned about the plight of the younger
workers within the protected category.
The strongest parts of the Hamilton opinion deal with the entire context of
the ADEA and the central goal of the statute to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination. The court believed that allowing reverse discrimination claims
would run contrary to the congressional purpose of the ADEA.104 The
Hamilton court clearly viewed the phenomenon of age discrimination as
separate and distinct from any other kind of discrimination.105 The court’s
concern about opening the floodgates of litigation is also well taken because
allowing the cause of action for reverse discrimination would dramatically
increase the reach of the ADEA.106
Following Hamilton, several courts rejected claims of reverse
discrimination.107 These courts accepted Hamilton as a practical and common
sense approach to the problem of reverse discrimination.108 The reasoning of
these courts, however, added little to the understanding of the judicial
interpretation of reverse discrimination, as none of the courts delved deeply
into analysis. While some of the courts expressly relied on Hamilton for the
proposition that reverse age discrimination is not actionable under the
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Several Recent Circuit Court Cases Clarify the Application of the ADEA to
Employee Benefit Plans, ERISA LITIG. REP., Oct. 1992, at 7, 9 (characterizing Hamilton “a rather
remarkable bit of statutory analysis”).
104. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228.
105. Id. at 1227 (distinguishing age discrimination from race and sex discrimination).
106. See discussion Part VI infra.
107. E.g., Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d 434, 437 (9th Cir. 1995); Greer v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., No. 00 CIV 1272 SAS, 2001 WL 137330, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 15, 2001);
Dittman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 941 F. Supp. 284, 287 (D. Conn. 1996), aff’d, 116 F.3d 465 (2d
Cir. 1997); Parker v. Wakelin, 882 F. Supp. 1131, 1140–41 (D. Me. 1995).
108. See, e.g., Greer, 2001 WL 137330, at *4.
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ADEA,109 other courts dismissed plaintiffs’ claims on alternative grounds.110
For example, the Ninth Circuit in Stone v. Travelers Corp. rejected a reverse
age discrimination claim under the ADEA that was based on an additional
form of Voluntary Severance Option (VSO) made available to employees older
than fifty-five.111 In Stone, a fifty-two-year-old employee was given a choice
of receiving his VSO as a lump sum or in monthly installments, while
employees older than fifty-five could also receive their severance benefits in
the form of a lifetime annuity.112 Although the court found the plaintiff’s
claim of age discrimination to be “unusual,” it rendered its judgment on a
narrower statutory ground than the Hamilton court.113 The court in Stone
determined that the ADEA barred the plaintiff’s claim because it specifies that
the employer does not violate the statute solely because “‘an employee pension
benefit plan . . . provides for the attainment of a minimum age as a condition of
eligibility.’”114
B. Reverse Age Discrimination Actionable: Cline v. General Dynamics Land
Systems, Inc.115
Before Cline, two circuits laid the groundwork for allowing reverse age
discrimination claims under the ADEA. The Tenth Circuit in Greene v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., reversed the grant of judgment as a matter of law to the
defendant-employer despite the fact that the replacement worker chosen by the
employer was five years older than the plaintiff.116 The Greene court
109. E.g., Lawrence v. Town of Irondequoit, 246 F. Supp. 2d 150, 161 (W.D.N.Y. 2002)
(citing Hamilton to support its dismissal of plaintiff’s claim based on reduction of retirement
health care benefits only for people younger than eighty); Greer, 2001 WL 137330, at *4 (relying
on Hamilton and Dittman to grant summary judgment for the employer); Dittman, 941 F. Supp. at
287 (citing Hamilton to support its conclusion that the “ADEA does not bar discrimination of the
young in favor of the old”); Parker, 882 F. Supp. at 1140–41 (stating that it was only
discrimination in favor of younger individuals that the law is designed to prohibit and then
referencing the holding of Hamilton). As of this writing, the latest court pronouncement on the
issue of reverse age discrimination also relied on Hamilton as precedent. See Feigl v. Ecolab,
Inc., No. 03 C 2290, 2003 WL 22096506 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2003).
110. E.g., Stone, 58 F.3d at 437.
111. Id. at 436.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 437.
114. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(l)(1)(A) (2000)). See also Dittman, 941 F. Supp. at 286–87
(holding that the minimum age requirement in the ERIP that was available to employees fifty
years and older was permissible under the plain language of section 623(l)(1)(A) of the ADEA).
But see Edwards v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 2 F.3d 382, 383 (11th Cir. 1993)
(sidestepping the issue of whether “reverse discrimination is, as a matter of law, ever covered by
the ADEA”).
115. 296 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003).
116. 98 F.3d 554, 556–62 (10th Cir. 1996) (fifty-two year old replaced by fifty-seven year
old).
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acknowledged that in order to satisfy the fourth element of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case,117 plaintiff must ordinarily prove that a younger
person replaced him or her.118 The court reasoned, however, that the
McDonnell Douglas approach is flexible and a plaintiff may be relieved of
satisfying all four elements in an extraordinary case.119
The Tenth Circuit proceeded to examine the evidence of discrimination
outside of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie proof scheme.120 The court
focused its inquiry on “whether Greene met ‘his burden directly, by presenting
direct or circumstantial evidence that age was a determining factor in his
discharge.’”121 The court weighed such evidence as the replacement of eight
senior executives older than fifty with younger employees, positive feedback
that the plaintiff received from management throughout his tenure, and certain
statements made by the company president to Greene regarding Greene’s
inability to “fit with the new culture.”122 The court reasoned that by replacing
the plaintiff with an older executive, the employer may have been creating a
temporary replacement for the plaintiff.123 The older replacement could have
been hired just to ward off a discrimination suit under the ADEA.124 The court
thus concluded that “evidentiary showings altogether raised a fact question for
the jury which could justify the trier of fact in disregarding [the] status [of] an
older replacement and in nevertheless finding age discrimination.”125
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Douglas v. Anderson stated in dicta that
replacement by an older employee does not necessarily foreclose prima facie
evidence of discrimination “if other direct or circumstantial evidence supports
an inference of discrimination.”126
117. The four-part evidentiary procedure used in discrimination cases was introduced by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green to allow plaintiffs, in cases of indirect
discrimination, to establish an inference of discrimination and reallocate the burden of production
to the defendant. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In the
context of a Title VII race-discrimination case, the plaintiff must carry the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case by showing the following:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of [the] complainant’s qualifications.
Id.
118. Greene, 98 F.3d at 559 (citing Lucas v. Dover Corp., 857 F.2d 1397, 1400 (10th Cir.
1988)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 559–60.
121. Id. at 560 (quoting Lucas, 857 F.2d at 1400).
122. Id. at 560–61.
123. Greene, 98 F.3d at 561.
124. Id. (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 n.9 (1st Cir. 1979)).
125. Id. at 562.
126. 656 F.2d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 1981).
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The Cline court squarely faced the issue of reverse discrimination. Cline
and 195 other workers at General Dynamics Land Systems filed a class-action
lawsuit against the company after it entered into a new collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA2”) with the United Auto Workers.127 While a previous
agreement that was in effect until July 1, 1997, required General Dynamics to
provide full health benefits to retired workers with thirty years of seniority,
CBA2 allowed the company to exclude retirees from receiving full health
benefits.128 The benefits were eliminated with one exception providing that
those employees who were fifty years or older at the time CBA2 took effect
would still be eligible to receive full health benefits upon retirement.129 Cline
and other employees in the forty to forty-nine-year-old age group alleged that
the provision of health benefits given only to the future retirees who were, at
the time, older than fifty violated the ADEA and the Ohio Civil Rights Act
because it discriminated against the employees between the ages of forty and
forty-nine solely on the basis of their age.130
The district court granted General Dynamics’s motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ claim.131 The lower court acknowledged that CBA2 “facially
discriminated” by creating two classes of employees based solely on age.132
The court concluded, however, that the ADEA does not allow claims for
“reverse discrimination” because the statute was drafted to aid “older workers,
not workers who suffer discrimination because they are too young.”133 In
declining to recognize the claim for reverse discrimination, the district court
relied on the established jurisprudence of other federal courts that held that “a
claim of reverse age discrimination is not cognizable under [the] ADEA.”134
The district court also interpreted the plaintiffs’ argument as a claim that they
were wrongfully denied existing job benefits on the basis of age.135 The
district court reasoned that under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA),136 the provision of health benefits was part of a welfare
benefit plan that the company was not obligated to provide to all employees.137

127. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003).
128. Id. at 468.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d. 846, 848 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
132. Id. at 848.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001–1461 (2000)).
137. Cline, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 848.
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The court stated that it would have been permissible to withhold retiree health
benefits from all employees under the CBA2.138
1.

Majority Opinion in Cline

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded
Cline for further proceedings.139 The three-member panel produced a majority
opinion written by Judge Ryan and joined by Judge Cole, a separate concurring
opinion by Judge Cole, and a dissenting opinion by Judge Williams, a district
court judge from Virginia sitting by designation.140 The split decision
“underscores the controversial nature of a reverse discrimination claim under
the ADEA.”141
The panel engaged in a lengthy analysis of the statutory language and
focused on the “plain language” of the ADEA.142 Judge Ryan stressed that
there was no reason to resort to legislative history in order to ascertain the
meaning of the ADEA because the language of the statute is “plain and
unambiguous.”143 In reviewing the language of § 623(a)(1) and § 631(a) of the
ADEA, the majority found that the wording of these sections prohibited an
employer from discriminating against “any individual” forty years of age or
older based on that person’s age.144 Judge Ryan emphasized that the use of the
phrase “any individual” in the language of the statute indicated that the law
was designed to equally protect all workers over forty, not just those at the
higher end of the age spectrum.145 He stated that, contrary to the conclusion of
the district court, “any individual” could not be read to mean “older
workers.”146 Judge Ryan also noted that “the fact that some members within
the protected class were beneficiaries of the discriminatory action of which
other members of the protected class—the plaintiffs—were victims, does not
somehow suspend the language of the statute, which prohibits age
discrimination against ‘any individual’ within the protected class.”147

138. Id.
139. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 472 (6th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003).
140. Id. at 467; see also David L. Hudson, Older Workers Claim Age Bias in Favor of Elders,
A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Aug. 2, 2002, at 4.
141. ADEA-Protected Workers Can Sue for ‘Reverse Discrimination’ Regarding Retiree
Health Coverage Under 6th Circuit Ruling, at http://www.thompson.com/libraries/benefits/self/
samplenews/self0210a.html (Oct. 2002).
142. Cline, 296 F.3d at 469.
143. Id.
144. Id. (stating that § 623(a)(1) contained a clear and unambiguous prohibition “from
defining the terms and benefits of . . . employment based solely on . . . age”).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Cline, 296 F.3d at 472.
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Congress’s reference to “older persons” and “older workers” in the
ADEA’s Statement of Finding and Purpose did not alter the majority’s
analysis. Judge Ryan criticized the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hamilton for
its reliance on the “hortatory, generalized language of Congress’s Statement of
Findings and Purpose in the ADEA,” and insisted that the specific language of
the statute should override the more generalized.148 In addition, Judge Ryan
relied on the EEOC’s interpretations as being true to the statutory language
because the EEOC determined in its guidelines that age discrimination within
the protected class is unlawful regardless of the parties’ respective ages.149
Judge Ryan insisted that the Cline case was not one of “reverse
discrimination” because the term “has no ascertainable meaning in the law.”150
He explained that “[a]n action is either discriminatory or it is not
discriminatory, and some discriminatory actions are prohibited by law.”151
Judge Ryan reiterated his concern about courts “address[ing] perceived
inadequacies” in statutes and derided the district court for having engaged in
an interpretive reading of the ADEA.152 In Judge Ryan’s view, the district
court redrafted the statute by substituting for “any individual” the term “older
workers” and referring only to “relatively older” employees within the
protected group.153 Judge Ryan further added that “[i]f Congress wanted to
limit the ADEA to protect only those workers who are relatively older, it
clearly had the power and acuity to do so,” but it did not.154 Thus, the Sixth
Circuit held that CBA2 “denied a group of employees within the protected
class an employee benefit based solely on [the employees’] age” and therefore
violated the ADEA.155
2.

Concurring Opinion in Cline

Judge Cole voiced “doubts as to whether Congress specifically intended”
to allow reverse age discrimination claims.156 The text and the structure of the
ADEA indicated to Judge Cole that Congress’s main goal was to prohibit age
discrimination that favors younger over older employees.157 Judge Cole
reasoned, however, “that Congress’s choice of language, whether specifically
intended or not, also prohibits age discrimination that favors older over

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 470.
Id. at 471 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (2000)). See supra note 91.
Id.
Id.
Cline, 296 F.3d at 469.
Id.
Id. at 472.
Id.
Id. (Cole, J., concurring).
Cline, 296 F.3d at 472–73 (Cole, J., concurring).
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younger protected employees.”158 While conceding that the court’s plain
language interpretation was counterintuitive, Judge Cole insisted that the Cline
decision was in line with existing canons of statutory construction.159
Judge Cole found that none of the exceptions to the plain meaning rule
were implicated in the case of reverse discrimination under the ADEA.160 He
found the text of § 623 and § 631 to be unequivocal in the general prohibition
of discrimination based on age.161 Stating that reference to “older workers” in
§ 621(a) was “at most ambiguous,” he found “no definite inconsistency”
between the literal interpretation of § 623 and § 631 and the language of §
621(a).162 Judge Cole also determined that congressional intent would not be
undermined by allowing a cause of action for reverse discrimination because
more favorable treatment by employers of older workers “furthers . . . arbitrary
age discrimination in employment.”163
Judge Cole rejected the social policy implications of allowing reverse
discrimination claims under the ADEA and opined that such an interpretation
of the statute would not lead to absurd results.164 He illustrated his point by
citing to several state court decisions that interpreted state anti-discrimination
laws to allow reverse discrimination suits.165 Judge Cole also attempted to
reconcile the decision in Cline with the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Connor
v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.166 In O’Connor, the Supreme Court
ruled that an ADEA plaintiff seeking to prove discrimination based upon
indirect evidence is not required to demonstrate that he or she was replaced by
a person outside of the protected class.167 The Court suggested instead that a
plaintiff may show, as part of the prima facie case, that he or she was replaced
by a person “substantially younger.”168 Judge Cole distinguished O’Connor on
the basis that Cline was a direct evidence case that did not rely upon the prima

158. Id. at 472.
159. Id. at 472–73, 476. Departures from the “plain meaning” rule of statutory construction
are authorized in the Sixth Circuit “(1) where the text is ambiguous; (2) where a literal reading is
inconsistent with other statutory provisions; (3) where a plain language reading is inconsistent
with congressional intent; [or] (4) where the plain statutory meaning leads to absurd results.” Id.
at 473 (citing Vergos v. Gregg’s Enters., Inc., 159 F.3d 989, 990 (6th Cir. 1998)).
160. Id. at 473.
161. Id.
162. Cline, 296 F.3d at 473 (Cole, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 474.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 474–75.
166. Id. at 472, 475.
167. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996).
168. Id.
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facie test169 and on the basis that the Supreme Court did not address reverse
discrimination in O’Connor.170
3.

Dissenting Opinion in Cline

Dissenting, Judge Williams emphasized that “no court in the nation has
recognized a claim for [reverse] age discrimination under the ADEA.”171
Judge Williams stressed that the purpose of the ADEA is to alleviate problems
faced by older workers, not the problems of younger ones, especially if they
are in the same protected class.172 Section 621 of the statute refers to “older
workers” and “older persons,” which indicated to Judge Williams that
Congress meant to prohibit employers from discriminating against older
workers as opposed to younger ones.173 Judge Williams found the reasoning of
the Hamilton court to be persuasive.174 Relying on the Seventh Circuit holding
in Hamilton, Judge Williams stressed the difference between age, which arises
from birth and is not immutable, and other protected categories such as race or
sex.175
Judge Williams also noted that the Sixth Circuit’s decision “potentially
could have a devastating effect on the collective bargaining process, calling
into question the validity of seniority and early retirement programs contained
in collective bargaining agreements across the country.”176 Judge Williams
also argued that a “common sense” understanding of the collective bargaining
agreement, which provided for the change in retiree health benefits,
necessitated a conclusion that “the ADEA was not intended to interfere with
the collective bargaining process or with collective bargaining agreements.”177

169. Cline, 296 F.3d at 475. The ADEA disparate treatment claims can be based either on
direct or indirect evidence. See Hein v. All Am. Plywood Co., 232 F.3d 482, 488 (6th Cir. 2000).
Direct evidence of discrimination is such “evidence which, if believed, would prove the existence
of [unlawful discrimination] without any inferences or presumptions.” Bodenheimer v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1993). An example of direct evidence of a discriminatory
intent is a facially-discriminatory employment policy, such as the policy giving preferential
treatment to workers older than fifty in Cline. The four-part prima facie framework of
McDonnell Douglas is inapplicable in direct evidence cases. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). For discussion of the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary
framework, see supra note 117.
170. Cline, 296 F.3d at 475 (Cole, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 476 (Williams, J., dissenting).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Cline, 296 F.3d at 476 (Williams, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 476.
177. Id.
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It was apparent to Judge Williams that the needs of older people increase with
age, thus necessitating increased protection or increased benefits.178
IV. CRITICAL EVALUATION OF CLINE
A.

Statutory Construction

At the core of the court’s reasoning in Cline, and the split decision that the
Cline court produced, lies a basic dispute about the proper approach to
statutory construction. The two main approaches to statutory interpretation are
the plain-meaning rule and the approach that takes into account the purposes
behind the statute and its legislative history. It is well accepted that courts
“‘must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’”179
The issue of how to determine what constitutes ambiguity is less certain, as the
Supreme Court has provided several criteria to determine ambiguity.180 Under
certain circumstances, for the statute to be unambiguous “[i]t need only be
‘plain to anyone reading the Act’ that the statute encompasses the conduct at
issue.”181 However, the “plainness or ambiguity of statutory language”
sometimes amounts to a complicated inquiry that takes into account “the
language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the
broader context of the statute as a whole.”182
If the statutory language is not manifestly unambiguous, the inquiry does
not cease but proceeds to an examination of the statutory scheme to see if it is
“‘coherent and consistent.’”183 In doing so, “absurd results are to be avoided
and [the] internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt with.”184 When
the plain meaning of a statute is not clear, legislative history becomes
important in an attempt to divine congressional intent. Although Justice Scalia
has vehemently opposed the use of legislative history in statutory

178. Id.
179. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 523 U.S. 382, 387 (1998) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)).
180. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (stating that specific
canons of statutory construction “‘are often countered . . . by some maxim pointing in a different
direction’”) (quoting Circuit City Stores v. Adams, Inc., 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001)).
181. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 60 (1997) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 467 (1991)).
182. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
183. Id. at 340 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).
184. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981).
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interpretation,185 the majority of the Supreme Court finds legislative history
instructive when interpreting statutes.186
Even when faced with a civil rights statute that seems unambiguous on its
face, the Supreme Court has, in the past, engaged in an interpretive reading of
the statute. One of the familiar examples is Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,187
which involved a sweeping reconceptualization of Title VII. In Griggs, the
Supreme Court enunciated a disparate impact theory of discrimination, finding
that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”188 While the Supreme Court
in Griggs increased the reach of Title VII, in other cases it has narrowed the
scope of the statute’s coverage.189
The majority and concurrence in Cline insisted that the plain meaning of
the ADEA commands that the court should not look outside the statute itself.190
The Cline majority’s strident opposition to the idea of having to engage in an
interpretive reading of the statute seems misplaced. That the panel itself was
split regarding the breadth of the ADEA’s reach confirms the fact that the
language of the statute is anything but plain. That reasonable minds could
differ regarding the meaning of the ADEA prohibition is also manifest in the
diametrically opposing views of the Seventh and Sixth Circuits.
The Cline court’s rigid application of the plain-meaning rule, while
completely ignoring congressional intent, is an extreme example of the
textualist approach to statutory interpretation.191 The logic of the majority can

185. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 29–37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
186. See, e.g., Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pa., 458 U.S. 375, 384–91 (1982) (relying on
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 can be
violated only by purposeful discrimination).
187. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
188. Id. at 431.
189. E.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481–84 (1999). See Wendy E.
Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the Meaning of
Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53, 54 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court in
Sutton narrowed the scope of the Americans with Disabilities Act and disregarded the legislative
history and the guidance provided by administrative interpretations of the statute). See also infra
notes 185–188 and accompanying text.
190. See supra Parts III.B.1–2 for a discussion of the majority and concurring opinions in
Cline.
191. Recent Case, Cline v. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir.
2002), 116 HARV. L. REV. 1533 passim (2003). The textualist approach to statutory construction
is embodied in the views of Justice Scalia who advocates the “plain meaning” view. See Parmet,
supra note 189, at 68–69. Under the textualist approach, “[w]hen the particular words at issue are
not completely clear, their meaning may be discerned by analysis of the statute’s text as a whole,
dictionaries, grammar books, and the traditional common law canons of statutory construction.”
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be boiled down to a syllogism that Judge Ryan himself found amusing: “The
ADEA expressly prohibits denying any employee within the protected class an
employment benefit solely because of age. The CBA2 provision . . . denies . . .
[such] benefit based solely on [the employee’s] age. Therefore, the ADEA
prohibits the CBA2 provision in question.”192 Courts, however, are charged
with an infinitely more difficult task than applying syllogisms when it comes
to statutory construction: “As in all cases of statutory construction, [the
court’s] task is to interpret the words of [the statute] in light of the purposes
Congress sought to serve.”193
B.

The Language of the ADEA: 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) and § 631(a)(2)

The categorical prohibition of discrimination “because of [an] individual’s
age”194 in § 623(a)(1) of the ADEA may suggest that the prohibition applies
symmetrically to the members of the protected group. Certainly, the literal
reading of this section would lead to this conclusion. Moreover, there is some
arguable support for this position in other portions of the statute as well.
Phrases like “because of such individual’s age,” “on the basis of such
individual’s age,” or “because of his age,” if read literally, lend themselves to
an interpretation that absolutely prohibits the use of age as a factor in
employment decisions.195
In concluding that the prohibition against discrimination based on age
encompasses discrimination against the older and the younger cohorts, the
majority in Cline never considered the various meanings commonly ascribed to
the word “age.” The Cline court simply assumed that “age” means
“chronological age.” Most dictionaries, in fact, do offer “the length of time
during which a being or thing has lived or existed” as the most common
definition of “age.”196 The word “age,” however, has many alternative
meanings.197 Among the accepted meanings are the “quality or state of being
Id. at 69 (footnotes omitted). Textualists eschew references to legislative history and statutory
goals for fear of interjecting the judges own policy preferences into the law. Id.
192. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 472 (6th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003).
193. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979).
194. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
195. See id. § 623(a)(1), (a)(2), (b), (c)(1), (c)(2); Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d
1226, 1228 (7th Cir. 1992).
196. E.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 40 (1993). See also THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 176 (1961) (defining age as
“[a] period of existence” and “[t]he whole duration of . . . existence”).
197. “Age” has been variously defined. E.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 40 (1993) (defining age as “the time of life at which
one becomes naturally or conventionally qualified or disqualified for something” and “a measure
of the development, capacity, condition, or quality of an individual”); THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 176 (1961) (defining age as “[a] naturally distinct portion of the existence of a man
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old,”198 “[t]he latter part of life, when the physical effects of protracted
existence become apparent; old age,”199 or “state of having lived long.”200
Common to all these definitions is that age is viewed as a state relative to
youth or younger generations as well as the connotation of advancement and
maturity associated with the word “age.”
The use of dictionary meanings of words in construing legislation is a
common practice for the courts.201 While by no means “substitute[s] for close
analysis of what words mean as used in a particular statutory context,”202
dictionaries are useful in statutory construction. The existence of alternative
definitions of the word “age” supports the proposition that the wording of the
ADEA is open to interpretation.203 By failing to include the alternative
meanings of the word “age” in its construction of the statutory prohibition
against age discrimination, the Sixth Circuit departed from the plain meaning
approach that it espoused.
Instead of focusing on the meanings of the word “age” in interpreting the
statute, the Cline majority relied heavily on the ADEA’s references to
“individuals” as opposed to groups.204 The Supreme Court’s decision in
O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. is instructive in understanding
the weight that the Supreme Court assigns to the ADEA prohibition of
discrimination against an “individual.” In O’Connor, the Supreme Court
or other being,” and “a generation”); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 24–25
(3d ed. 2000) (defining age as “one of the stages of life,” and “the period of history during which
a person lives”).
198. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
40 (1993). See also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 24–25 (3d ed. 2000)
(defining age as “[t]he state of being old”).
199. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 176 (1961). See also THE OXFORD REFERENCE
DICTIONARY 11 (1989) (defining age as “the later part of life, old age”); WEBSTER’S II NEW
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 21 (1995) (defining age as “[t]he latter portion of life”).
200. ENCARTA WORLD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, at http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/
dictionary/dictionaryhome.aspx (2003).
201. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225–27 (1994) (considering
dictionary definitions of the word “modify” in interpreting the Communications Act); Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417–19 (1992) (reviewing various
dictionary definitions of the word “required” in interpreting condemnation provisions of the Rail
Passenger Service Act). See also Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1437 (1994) (finding that “the Supreme Court has referred to
dictionaries in more than six hundred cases over a period of two centuries”).
202. MCI Telecomms., 512 U.S. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. See id. at 227 (stating that “[m]ost cases of verbal ambiguity in statutes involve . . . a
selection between accepted alternative meanings shown as such by many dictionaries”); Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 503 U.S. at 418 (stating that “[t]he existence of alternative dictionary
definitions . . . each making sense under the statute, itself indicates that the statute is open to
interpretation”).
204. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 469–70 (6th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003).
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considered whether an employee “must show that he was replaced by someone
outside the age group protected by the ADEA to make out a prima facie case”
of age discrimination.205 The plaintiff was fifty-six years old when he was
fired and replaced by a forty-year-old.206 The district court found that the
plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas
framework because he had produced no evidence that he was replaced with a
person outside the protected class.207 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s dismissal of the case and held that an ADEA plaintiff must prove that
he was replaced by an individual with comparable qualifications who is not
within the age group that is protected by the ADEA.208
Without deciding the propriety of applying the McDonnell Douglas
evidentiary framework to cases brought under the ADEA, the Supreme Court
reversed the appellate court’s decision.209 The Court scrutinized the language
of the ADEA and determined that the ADEA “does not ban discrimination
against employees because they are aged 40 or older; it bans discrimination
against employees because of their age, but limits the protected class to those
who are 40 or older.”210 The Court concluded that “[t]he fact that one person
in the protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is
thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age.”211 Justice Scalia,
writing for the unanimous court, stated:
[T]he prima facie case requires “evidence adequate to create an inference that
an employment decision was based on a[n] [illegal] discriminatory
criterion . . . .” In the age-discrimination context, such an inference cannot be
drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly
younger. Because the ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and
not class membership, the fact that a replacement is substantially younger than
the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination than is the
fact that the plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class.212

There are two possible readings of O’Connor. The Supreme Court’s
statement that so long as the aggrieved party “has lost out because of his age,”
205. 517 U.S. 308, 309 (1996). See supra note 117 for a discussion of the framework of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case of discrimination.
206. Id. at 309–10.
207. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 829 F. Supp. 155, 158, 160 (W.D.N.C. 1993).
208. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 546, 550 (4th Cir. 1995).
209. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 311–13. Because the parties did not contest the propriety of
applying the McDonnell Douglas analysis to ADEA cases, the Court proceeded on the
assumption that such application was appropriate. Id. at 311.
210. Id. at 312.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 312–13 (emphasis in original omitted) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The
Court pointed out that “there can be no greater inference of age discrimination . . . when a 40year-old is replaced by a 39-year-old than when a 56-year-old is replaced by a 40-year-old.” Id.
at 312.
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the claim for age discrimination will stand even if both people are in the
protected class, appears to support the claim for reverse discrimination. Such
an interpretation, however, would take the Court’s statements out of context.
Unlike Cline, O’Connor involved a plaintiff who was older than the defendant.
The Court’s specific reference to an employee “younger than the plaintiff”
indicates that the Court contemplated that the plaintiff in the ADEA case must
be older (or substantially older) in order to establish a prima facie case.213
On the other hand, it may be argued that the Supreme Court’s
pronouncements in O’Connor are only marginally relevant to the issue of
reverse discrimination. The primary focus of the Supreme Court’s decision in
O’Connor was whether the replacement worker must be outside the protected
class, not whether a younger plaintiff may bring a claim under the ADEA. The
Court pointed out that a substantial age gap was important in establishing the
inference of discrimination.214 Nevertheless, when viewed in conjunction with
the provisions of the ADEA that refer to the rights of “older” individuals, the
“substantially younger” test established in O’Connor is difficult to reconcile
with the idea of youth discrimination.
The Supreme Court’s reliance on the word “individual” is also manifest in
its interpretation of other anti-discrimination statutes. For example, in Sutton
v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether
corrective and mitigating measures should be taken into account when
determining whether an individual is disabled under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”).215 The Court relied on the “individualized
inquiry” mandated by the ADA provisions that dictate that the disabilities be
evaluated “with respect to an individual” and in terms of the impact of a
condition on “such individual.”216 The Court concluded that determination of
an employee’s disability should be made with reference to the mitigating
measures he or she employs.217
Sutton, however, may be distinguished for the most obvious reason that it
dealt not with the ADEA but with a parallel provision of the ADA.218 Another
213. Id. at 313 (emphasis added). See also Stein v. Nat’l City Bank, 942 F.2d 1062, 1064–65
(6th Cir. 1991) (listing, as the fourth element of the prima facie case, the fact that a person
younger than the plaintiff was selected for the position over the plaintiff).
214. See O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 312. “[T]he fact that a replacement is substantially younger
than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination than is the fact that the
plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class.” Id. at 313.
215. 527 U.S. 471, 481 (1999). See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000)).
216. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) and concluding that the
determination of disability is based on the effects of the impairment on the individual’s life).
217. Id. at 482.
218. There is no indication in any of the Supreme Court’s ADEA decisions that the Court
finds it necessary to harmonize the interpretation of the ADEA and the ADA. The only two
Supreme Court ADA cases that cited a case arising under the ADEA are EEOC v. Waffle House,
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factor that reduces the impact of the Court’s analysis in Sutton on the approach
to the interpretation of the ADEA is that the Sutton Court’s reliance on the
“individualized inquiry” was just one of the factors that the Court considered
in reaching its conclusion. By contrasting the congressional finding that 43
million Americans are disabled with the studies showing that approximately
160 million people in the United States suffer from serious impairments, the
Court determined that Congress did not intend to bring all those whose
uncorrected conditions amount to disabilities within the protection of the
ADA.219 In fact, the Court stated that the inquiry into congressional findings
was critical to its decision.220 The importance of congressional findings was
informed by the fact that they were included in the text of the ADA and
therefore give content to the term “disability.”221 While purporting to rely on
the plain meaning of the ADA, the Court also considered “the letter and the
spirit of the ADA,”222 reflected on whether the opposite approach would create
an anomalous result,223 and examined congressional findings that had been
enacted as part of the ADA.224
Thus, it appears that the exclusive focus of the Cline court on the effects of
discrimination on an individual is misplaced. A broader analysis comparing
the central prohibition of the ADEA with the entire statutory scheme, which
had been the unanimous view of the courts prior to Cline, is a more logical
approach.

Inc., and Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring. In both cases, the ADEA reference appeared in dicta.
See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 299–300 n.1 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991), which was brought
under the ADEA, in support of the proposition that claims brought under the ADA may be subject
to compulsory arbitration); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 617 n.1 (1999)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Title VII cases should be consulted for definitions of
“discrimination” and referring to the Court’s reliance on Title VII cases in the ADEA case of
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)).
219. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484–87. The congressional finding that 43 million people are
disabled is based on the functional understanding of disability. Id. at 485–86. By contrast,
studies based on nonfunctional approaches to disability estimate the number of the disabled to
include more than 160 million people. Id. at 485. Therefore, the congressional finding of the
substantially lower number of 43 million people “reflects an understanding that those whose
impairments are largely corrected by medication or other devices are not ‘disabled’ within the
meaning of the ADA.” Id. at 486.
220. Id. at 484.
221. Id. at 487.
222. Id. at 484.
223. Id.
224. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484–89.
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C. The Language of the ADEA: 29 U.S.C. § 621
While § 623 and § 631 of the ADEA prohibit age discrimination against
any individual, the ADEA’s purpose section manifests concern with the “older
worker.”225 The court in Cline purported to have easily reconciled the relevant
provisions of the ADEA by summarily concluding that “[i]n § 621, Congress
declared its intention to protect older workers, and in § 623 and § 631, it
identified the older workers it intends to protect as ‘any individual’ age 40 or
older.”226 The rigid reliance on this language of the ADEA, which proscribes
discrimination “because of . . . age,”227 appears to render superfluous the
references to “older workers” in the purpose section of the statute.228 As such,
it runs afoul of the necessity to “interpret statutes as a whole, giving effect to
each word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that
renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or
superfluous.”229
Admittedly, the term “older employee” is itself open to interpretation. One
plausible reading of the reference to “older employee” is that it sets apart the
protected category—employees older than forty—from employees outside a
protected class. Another reading zeroes in on the comparative form of the
adjective “old,”230 which suggests that the plaintiff in an ADEA case must be
older than the competitor employee who was treated more favorably. While
the text of the ADEA does not conclusively answer which definition Congress
had in mind, the legislative history discussed in Part IV.F of this Note tends to
support the latter interpretation. Indeed, the concurring judge in Cline
admitted that it might be reasonable to read “older” as a comparative
category.231 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s use of the term “older” in
O’Connor demonstrates that the ADEA only protects older employees as
related to those who are chronologically younger.232
While the Cline majority criticized the Hamilton court for relying too
much on the congressional statement of purpose, calling the language in § 621

225. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1), (a)(3) (2000).
226. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted,
123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003).
227. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (a)(2) (2000).
228. Id. § 621(a)(1), (a)(3).
229. Cline, 296 F.3d at 471 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted); see also FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (requiring courts to interpret a
statute “‘as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,’ and ‘fit, if possible, all parts into an
harmonious whole’”) (citations omitted)).
230. See THE OXFORD REFERENCE DICTIONARY 176 (1989) (defining “comparative degree”
as “the form expressing a higher degree of quality”).
231. Cline, 296 F.3d at 472–73 (Cole, J., concurring).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 190–199.
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“hortatory,”233 the importance of congressional findings should not be
underestimated.234 Congress saw it fit to include the findings in the ADEA
provisions. In addition, two other sections of the ADEA specifically reference
the purposes of the statute in their text.235 The prohibitions of the ADEA
cannot be understood apart from the congressional statement of findings and
purpose that provides:
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find
themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and especially
to regain employment when displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise desirable
practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment
with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and employer acceptability is,
relative to the younger ages, high among older workers; their numbers are
great and growing; and their employment problems grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary
discrimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce and the free
flow of goods in commerce.236

The multiple references to “older” persons in the statement of finding and
purpose recognize that discrimination occurs with greater frequency and causes
greater harm to older employees.237 The statement also underscores that the
main thrust of congressional concern was arbitrary age discrimination.238
Arbitrary age discrimination significantly differs from employment decisions
made on the basis of age. “Decisions made on the basis of age means [sic] that
the employer considers the age of an employee . . . when it makes employment
decisions because the characteristic of age is actually relevant to the choice
being made, and thus needs to be taken into account by the decision maker.”239

233. Cline, 296 F.3d at 470.
234. See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 484 (1999). See also supra text
accompanying notes 205–208.
235. 29 U.S.C. § 623(j)(2) (2000) (stating that it is not unlawful for a government employer to
refuse to hire or discharge any individual “pursuant to a bona fide hiring or retirement plan that is
not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter”); id. § 623(f)(2)(B)(ii) (stating that it shall
not be unlawful for an employer “to observe the terms of a . . . voluntary early retirement
incentive plan [that is] consistent with the relevant purpose or purposes of this chapter”).
236. Id. § 621(a) (emphasis added).
237. Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate Impact
Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REV. 267, 272
(1995).
238. See Blumrosen, supra note 41, at 74–83.
239. Pontz, supra note 237, at 273 n.36.
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In contrast, arbitrary age discrimination entails consideration of age, despite
the fact that age bears no relation to the choice being made and should not
factor into the decision-making.240
Examples of permissible age considerations abound not only in the ADEA,
but in other federal legislation as well. A person’s age, at any level, will either
grant the right to or prohibit access to societal benefits.241 Age prohibits young
people from voting, working, drinking alcohol, and driving, and it initiates the
right or obligation to serve in the armed services.242 Age also serves as a
restriction on an individual’s ability to serve as America’s elected presidents,
senators, and representatives.243 Some classes of benefits, such as Social
Security, are primarily available to people of advanced age.244 In addition to
Social Security, there are more than a hundred federal, state, and local
programs that exclusively benefit senior citizens.245
In the context of employment, the most obvious examples of federal
legislation that provide enhanced benefits to older individuals are certain
provisions of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”).246 These
benefits become available upon attainment of a minimum age and thus facially
differentiate between employees in the category protected by the ADEA. For
example, only employees that are fifty-five and older are allowed a diversified
account under the Employee Stock Ownership Plan.247 Once an employee
reaches the age of fifty-nine and a half, the I.R.C. allows a ten percent tax
waiver on early distributions from qualified retirement plans.248 Age sixty-five

240. Id.
241. McMorrow, supra note 39, at 352.
242. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, §1 (right to vote accrues at age 18); 29 U.S.C. §
203(l)(1) (2000) (child labor is restricted to ages sixteen and older); 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2000)
(federal highway funds are withheld from states that allow persons younger than twenty-one years
of age to purchase alcohol); 10 U.S.C. § 519 (2000) (individuals who are at least eighteen years
of age may be temporarily enlisted in the military during war time)); see also, e.g., MO. REV.
STAT. § 302.178.1 (Supp. 2002) (intermediate driver’s license available to persons older sixteen).
243. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (limiting the age of representatives to twenty-five years or
older); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (limiting the age of Senators to thirty years or older); U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (limiting the age of the President to thirty-five years or older).
244. McMorrow, supra note 39, at 352. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(l) (2000) (determining Social
Security eligibility by reference to a “normal retirement age” of sixty-five).
245. McMorrow, supra note 39, at 352. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) (2000) (employee
retirement income security); 45 U.S.C. § 231a(a)(1)(i) (2000) (annuity eligibility requirements).
246. Brief of the ERISA Industry Committee as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
*4–*13, Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., v. Cline, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003) (No. 02-1080),
available at 2003 WL 21649495. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2000); id. § 72(t)(2).
247. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(28)(B)(iii) (2000). See Brief of the ERISA Industry Committee as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 246, at *5 (citing 26 U.S.C. §
401(a)(28)(B)(iii) (2000)).
248. See Brief of the ERISA Industry Committee as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 246, at *5 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(i) (2000)).
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serves as a milestone that enables an individual to receive retirement benefits
immediately upon termination of employment, provided that the employee
began participating in the plan at least ten years earlier.249
All of these statutes are premised on the implicit acceptance of the validity
of generalizations about old age and the fact that “age distinctions are not
always arbitrary because the needs of individuals may vary according to their
age.”250 When viewed in conjunction with congressional recognition of
permissible age distinctions reflected in other federal legislation, the statement
of findings and purpose contained in § 621 of the ADEA supports the view
that, in enacting the ADEA, Congress sought to address the issues faced by
American workers as they grow older. The purposes of the ADEA are not
compromised when older workers within the protected group are given
preferential treatment. Therefore, the purpose section of the ADEA appears
consistent with precluding a cause of action for reverse age discrimination.
D. Significance of the Protected Class Under the ADEA
The Cline court paid little attention to the fact that the ADEA uses an
arbitrary minimum age threshold to trigger its protections. This minimum age
criterion is a powerful reminder that the ADEA itself discriminates on the basis
of age. The Committee on Education and Labor chose forty as the lower age
limit because of testimony that “indicated this to be the age at which age
discrimination in employment becomes evident.”251 The Committee
determined that “a further lowering of the age limit proscribed by the bill
would lessen the primary objective; that is, the promotion of employment
opportunities for older workers.”252
By originally defining the protected class as employees between the ages
of forty and sixty-five, Congress was “obviously unwilling to prohibit all agebased restrictions in employment.”253 The affirmative grant of the right to be
free from age discrimination solely to people forty and older appears to be a
feature that is truly unique to the ADEA. Remarkably, when Congress passed

249. See id. at *5 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(14) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (2000)).
250. McMorrow, supra note 39, at 352. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 90-805, at 7 (1967),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 80 (1981) (noting that “[t]oo many
different types of situations in employment occur for the strict application of general prohibitions
and provisions”).
251. H.R. REP. NO. 90-805, at 6 (1967), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at
79 (altering the lower age limit from forty-five in the original bill to forty).
252. Id.
253. McMorrow, supra note 39, at 352. For example, by originally limiting the protected
class, Congress knowingly allowed discriminatory practices such as mandatory retirement of
stewardesses at age thirty-two. Id. at 352–53.
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the Age Discrimination Act in 1975, it provided no minimum age threshold.254
“By not setting a minimum age for protection under the [Age Discrimination
Act], Congress suggested that the young are often subject to discrimination
and, therefore, warrant protection as well.”255 Within the framework of the
Age Discrimination Act, which prohibits discrimination in federal
employment, Congress was concerned with younger workers as well as older
ones.256 By contrast, exclusion of the young from the purview of the ADEA
suggests that Congress implicitly rejected the idea that relatively younger
workers need protection under the ADEA.
E.

The ADEA Exceptions

The impropriety of allowing a cause of action for reverse age
discrimination becomes even clearer when the ADEA exceptions are
considered. Unlike Title VII, which prohibits employment decisions in which
race plays any role257 and allows very limited exceptions for other categories
based only on bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs),258 the ADEA is
subject “to an unprecedented number of exceptions.”259 The ADEA recognizes
a BFOQ exception,260 a general exception for “reasonable factors other than
age,”261 exceptions for executives,262 and exceptions for certain aspects of
fringe benefits and retirement plans.263 The “statutory defenses are consistent

254. The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-135, 78 Stat. 728 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101–07 (2000)). The Age Discrimination Act protects individuals
from age discrimination not only in employment, but in programs and activities receiving federal
assistance. See 42 U.S.C. § 6101–02 (2000).
255. Fuhrman, supra note 15, at 599.
256. See id. at 599 n.114 (citing 121 CONG. REC. 9212 (1975) (statement of Rep. Brademas
stating that the Act’s “provisions are broad and it is the intent of the committee that it apply to
age discrimination at all age levels, from the youngest to the oldest”)); Woodruff, supra note 20,
at 1304 (stating that in passing the Age Discrimination Act, Congress was aware that employees
younger than forty can also be subjected to age discrimination).
257. This statement is limited to the extent that courts have interpreted Title VII to tolerate
affirmative action. See United Steelworkers of Am., AFL–CIO–CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
208 (1979) (holding that Title VII does not prohibit “all private, voluntary, race-conscious
affirmative action plans”).
258. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(e)(1), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(1) (2000)). See also Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 702, 703(e)(2),
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-1(a),
2000e-2(e)(2)(2000)) (setting out exceptions to prohibitions against religious discrimination).
259. George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment
Discrimination Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 495 (1995).
260. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
261. Id.
262. Id. § 631(c) (permitting under certain conditions compulsory retirement after age 65 of
“bona fide executive[s]” or persons who occupy a “high policymaking position”).
263. Id. § 623(f)(2).
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with the ADEA’s [objective] of prohibiting only arbitrary age discrimination in
employment.”264
It is uncontested that the ADEA “does not require older workers to be
treated more favorably than younger ones.”265 However, among the ADEA
exceptions, one is a particularly telling example of Congress’s willingness to
allow employers to treat older workers within the protected category more
favorably than the younger ones.266 Rather than eliminating age classifications
in the abstract, Congress expressed its special concern for older workers in §
623(f)(2) of the ADEA by permitting bona fide seniority systems and bona fide
employee benefit plans.267
While the OWBPA, which amended the ADEA in 1990, posits that an
involuntary retirement plan constitutes a violation of the ADEA, it permits
ERIPs that are voluntary and consistent with the ADEA’s relevant purpose to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment.268 The OWBPA also
sanctions certain typical features of early retirement plans by specifically
describing them as consistent with the purposes of the ADEA. These features
include: (1) requiring a minimum age as a condition of eligibility for
participation; (2) providing subsidized early retirement benefits, and (3)
providing supplements to Social Security benefits.269
It stands to reason that insofar as seniority systems and ERIPs favor older
employees over younger ones, “Congress in the Act has expressed at least tacit
approval” of employers that “favor the aged over the young.”270 As
Issacharoff and Harris eloquently stated when assessing ERIP provisions,
“[w]hen it came to benefiting older workers . . . delineations based on age and
violations of the equal treatment principle proved to be more than just
acceptable—they were required.”271 The need for older cohorts within the
protected class to have additional protection or preferential treatment is a

264. Pontz, supra note 237, at 276.
265. See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn’t Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093, 1123 n.113
(1993).
266. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (2000).
267. See Neil H. Abramson, Early Retirement Incentives Under the ADEA, 11 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 323, 351 n.157 (1989).
268. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(A), (B)(ii) (2000). See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text
for a general overview of the OWBPA. The OWBPA permits age distinctions in employee
benefit plans only if the benefits paid or the costs incurred on behalf of an older worker are at
least equal to those of a younger worker. Id. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i).
269. Pub. L. No. 101-433, Title I, § 103, 104 Stat. 978 (1990); 29 U.S.C. 623(f)(2)(B)(ii)
(2000).
270. See Abramson, supra note 267, at 351 n.157.
271. Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 77, at 816.
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contested issue.272 Regardless of one’s opinion on whether this need is truly
justified, the congressional intent as exemplified by the seniority and benefit
exceptions cannot be ignored. Recognizing a cause of action for reverse
discrimination under the ADEA will lead to the glaring inconsistency of
allowing preferential treatment of older cohorts within the protected category
in one context, yet disavowing benefits that may accrue to older workers in
other contexts.
F.

Legislative History

One must wonder whether those who supported the passage of the ADEA
truly contemplated that younger workers would be able to claim the protection
of the statute because they were treated less favorably than older workers.
Careful examination of the congressional record reveals few comments that
considered the possibility of reverse discrimination. Senator Dominick stated
that “under at least one interpretation of this bill[,] it would be legal to
discriminate on the ground of age as between any two people” in the category
of workers between forty to sixty-five.273 Senator Dominick specifically
questioned whether the creation of the protected category of people over forty
would open the employer up to a charge by a younger worker within the
protected class if the employer gives preferential treatment to an older
employee.274
The only response to Senator Dominick’s concern came in the comment by
Senator Yarborough who stated that it was not the intent of the law to “permit
discrimination in employment on account of age, whether discrimination might
be attempted between a man 38 and one 52 years of age, or between one 42
and one 52 years of ago [sic].”275 The conflicting comments of Senators
Dominick and Yarborough may be indicative of the competing congressional
purpose. Conversely, the lack of response from other members of Congress to
the possibility of intragroup discrimination may simply reveal that the

272. See id. at 783, 795, 816 (stating that the ADEA became a wealth-grabbing mechanism
for older white male employees). Issacharoff & Harris argue that “[t]his profile of both the
typical ADEA plaintiff and the subject of litigation suggests that the ADEA has developed into a
wrongful termination cause of action . . . rather than the protection against categorical action
based on the sort of invidious motivation generally associated with the term ‘discrimination’ and
originally envisioned by Congress.” Id. at 796.
273. S. REP. NO. 723, at 15 (1967) (individual views of Sen. Dominick), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 119–20.
274. Id. at 15–16. Senator Dominick noted that “one committee counsel has stated that if
both parties are within the protected age, neither can sue, while another counsel interprets the bill
to mean just the opposite.” Id. at 16.
275. 113 CONG. REC. 31,255 (1967), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at
146.
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supporters of the bill did not see the problem of reverse age discrimination as
an issue.
In fact, the entire congressional debate was based on reports that detailed
age discrimination in the classic sense—in favor of younger workers. In
enacting the ADEA, Congress “clearly was concerned with the plight of the
older worker and the fact that discrimination seemed to intensify as employees
progressed in age.”276 The frequent references to “senior citizens” by the bill’s
sponsors can hardly be translated to mean people in their early forties.277
In addition, the legislative history of the ADEA is replete with evidence
that Congress was not concerned with the “hazards of age classifications per
se,” but rather with the inaccurate stereotypes and misconceptions about the
Congress’s concern with arbitrary age
abilities of older workers.278
discrimination is illustrated by President Johnson’s message to Congress
recommending enactment of the ADEA in which he characterized the ADEA
as “a law prohibiting arbitrary and unjust discrimination in employment
because of a person’s age.”279 The legislative history suggests that Congress
did not seek to eliminate “all age classifications from the workplace, regardless
of which age cohort benefited from those classifications.”280 In the words of
Senator Yarborough, the ADEA is “not directed to all instances of
differentiation on the basis of age.”281
The Wirtz Report that argued for passage of the federal age discrimination
statute did not focus on animus-based discrimination against older workers.282
Researchers have also found that “‘the kind of ‘we–they’ thinking that foster[s]
racial, ethnic, and sexual discrimination is unlikely to play a role in the
treatment of the elderly worker . . . because the people who make the firing and
hiring decisions are often older individuals.”283 Therefore, to presume the
existence of such animus within the protected group seems unreasonable.
Consequently, providing greater benefits to older employees does not entail
276. Abramson, supra note 267, at 351.
277. E.g., 113 CONG. REC. 2467 (1967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 66.
278. Abramson, supra note 267, at 351.
279. Lyndon B. Johnson, AID FOR THE AGED: A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc.
No. 40, 90th Cong. (Jan. 23, 1967), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 60, 61.
280. Abramson, supra note 267, at 351.
281. 113 CONG. REC. 2467 (1967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 42, at 66.
282. See supra notes 41–52 and accompanying text. See also DAVID NEUMARK, AGE
DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8152, 2001) (citing THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 42),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8152. By contrast, race discrimination has a “welldocumented history of animus,” which sets it apart from age discrimination. See id.
283. See Neumark, supra note 282, at 18 (quoting RICHARD POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE
320 (1995)).
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stigmatization of younger workers within the protected group, which is
commonly associated with race or sex discrimination. Allowing a cause of
action for reverse discrimination would replace the congressional “concern for
the vulnerability of older workers at the end of the life-cycle . . . by an
inflexibly reactive approach which [makes] any age classification
presumptively invalid.”284
G. The EEOC Interpretation
The majority in Cline placed great reliance on the EEOC’s interpretation of
intragroup discrimination under the ADEA. “[T]he EEOC has statutory
authority to investigate claims and bring actions independent” of the ability of
individual employees to bring claims.285 The EEOC has interpreted the ADEA
in 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a), which states:
It is unlawful . . . for an employer to discriminate in hiring or in any other way
by giving preference because of age between individuals 40 or over. Thus, if
two people apply for the same position, and one . . . is 42 and the other 52, the
employer may not lawfully turn down either one on the basis of age, but must
base such decision on the basis of some other factor.286

The EEOC Policy Guidance further elaborates on the issue and posits that
“discrimination on the basis of age is generally unlawful even between
individuals who are within the Protected Age Group.”287 In addition, in
section 1625.2(b) of its guidelines the EEOC provides that “additional benefits,
such as increased severance pay, to older employees within the protected group
may be lawful if an employer has a reasonable basis to conclude that those
benefits will counteract problems related to age discrimination.”288
The positions expressed by the EEOC in sections 1625.2(a) and (b) of its
guidelines appear to be somewhat inconsistent. While subsection (a) makes
284. Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 77, at 831.
285. EEOC v. Am. & Efird Mills, Inc., 964 F.2d 300, 301 (4th Cir. 1992). Originally,
Congress gave responsibility for enforcing the ADEA to the Department of Labor. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-902, §§ 6-7, 81 Stat. 602, 604-605
(1967). In 1979, Congress transferred these responsibilities to the EEOC. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of
1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978), reprinted in 92 Stat. 3781, 3781 (1978).
286. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (2002).
287. EEOC: CASES INVOLVING THE EXTENSION OF ADDITIONAL BENEFITS TO OLDER
WORKERS, POLICY GUIDANCE 2 (1988), reprinted in EEOC, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM, AGE DISCRIMINATION, § V(F) (1998). Notably, the Department of Labor, which was
in charge of enforcing the ADEA before the EEOC, issued several opinion letters that allowed for
preferential treatment of older workers within the protected group. See Barry Bennett Kaufman,
Preferential Hiring Policies for Older Workers Under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 825, 834 (1983). One of those letters approved the exclusion of workers
older than fifty from “‘comparatively undesirable work assignments’ such as compulsory
overtime.” Id. (quoting WH-419, EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) ¶ 5036 (July 1977)).
288. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(b).
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age an entirely impermissible characteristic to consider in employment
decisions, implicit in subsection (b) is the recognition by the EEOC of the
increased needs of older people within the protected group and the likelihood
that older individuals experience age discrimination to a greater extent than
younger ones. There are no reported cases where the courts have turned to
subsection (b) of the EEOC regulations, possibly because the claims of reverse
age discrimination have been exceedingly rare. The court in Cline also ignored
subsection (b) of the guidelines although the benefits at issue in Cline seem to
fit under the category of “additional benefits” contemplated by the EEOC in
section 1625(b) of the regulations.289
In order to determine whether Cline’s reliance on section 1625.2(a) of the
EEOC guidelines was justified, it is important to examine the role of the EEOC
guidelines in interpreting the civil rights statutes. Despite the fact that the
courts often consider the EEOC guidelines and afford deference to the EEOC
in their decisions,290 the EEOC’s interpretations are not entitled to Chevron
deference.291 As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Mead Corp.,
“‘interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines’” do not fall within the Chevron framework.292 This
explanation means that the EEOC interpretations are not binding and are only
accorded deference when they support the views of the courts on a substantive
issue.293

289. See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003) (citing to 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a), but not §1625.2(b)). The Cline
court may have been unwilling to raise the § 1625.2(b) exceptions if the parties did not assert
them.
290. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (administrative interpretation of
the Act by the enforcing agency, “while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance”). See also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141–42
(1976) (courts may refer to the EEOC interpretations for guidance but need not follow them);
Cline, 296 F.3d at 471 (6th Cir. 2002). “The EEOC’s interpretation of the ADEA ‘is significant
because an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous provision within the statute it is authorized to
implement is entitled to judicial deference.’” Cline, 296 F.3d at 471 (quoting Burzynski v.
Cohen, 264 F.3d 611, 619 (6th Cir. 2001)).
291. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44
(1984) (stating that the court should not impose its own construction of the statute if it determines
that the agency’s interpretation of the statute is based on a permissible construction).
292. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 223 n.17 (2001) (quoting Christensen v.
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
293. See generally John S. Moot, Comment, An Analysis of Judicial Deference to EEOC
Interpretive Guidelines, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 213 (1987). For example, the Supreme Court, in Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., determined that the EEOC regulations defining “physical impairment”
without reference to corrective measures were an impermissible interpretation of the ADA. 527
U.S. 471, 479–82 (1999). The Court found that the guidelines’ approach was “contrary to both
the letter and the spirit of the ADA.” Id. at 484.
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It is apparent that the Cline court’s reliance on the EEOC’s interpretation
of the ADEA is tenuous at best. The selective use of only section 1625.2(a) of
the EEOC guidelines and the inherent tension between the two subsections of
the EEOC guidelines raise concerns about the reliance of the Cline court on the
position expressed by the EEOC. The Hamilton court’s rejection of the EEOC
guidance on the issue of reverse discrimination seems to be a more sound
approach.294
H. State Law
The concurring opinion in Cline relied on the growing trend among state
courts to recognize a cause of action for reverse age discrimination based on
the states’ anti-discrimination laws.295 The ADEA does not preempt state laws
that provide additional protection against age discrimination in employment.296
Section 633(a) states that the ADEA will not affect the jurisdiction of the state
agencies performing similar functions, and § 633(b) gives state proceedings
certain priorities over federal actions relating to age discrimination.297 The
language of the ADEA providing that the commencement of a federal action
shall supersede state claims only means that the state proceedings will be
stayed, but not dismissed.298 Several courts have explicitly recognized that
state age discrimination laws do not need to conform to the ADEA.299 In fact,
some courts have held that the ADEA “anticipates and encourages state
regulation.”300
States vary considerably in the age range at which they provide
protection.301 The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) is a
typical example of a state law that contains a broad prohibition against age
discrimination in employment by stating that it is unlawful for an employer

294. See Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1227–28 (7th Cir. 1992).
295. Cline, 296 F.3d at 474–75 (Cole, J., concurring).
296. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (2000); see also Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1989)
(stating that “[t]he federal Act does not preempt state age discrimination laws”).
297. 29 U.S.C. §§ 633(a)–(b) (2000).
298. Dunlop v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 672 F.2d 1044, 1049 n.7 (2d Cir. 1982).
299. E.g., Johnson v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 547 N.W.2d 783, 787 (Wis. Ct. App.
1996) (stating that “state age discrimination laws do not need to conform to federal law”);
Kunzman v. Enron Corp., 902 F. Supp. 882, 902 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (stating that the ADEA “does
not preempt state age discrimination laws, so that the state court looks to its own act to determine
if plaintiff is a protected person”); Fink v. Kitzman, 881 F. Supp. 1347, 1366 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
300. E.g., Hillman v. Consumers Power Co., 282 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
301. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.6(3) (West 2000) (age eighteen or older); N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 296(3-a)(a) (Consol. 1975) (age eighteen or older); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.33(1) (West
2002) (age forty or older). Numerous states do not limit age discrimination protection to any
particular age. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(1) (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
760.10(1)(a) (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (West 2002); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 354-A:7 (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (2001).
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“because of the . . . age . . . of any individual . . . to refuse to hire or employ or
to bar or to discharge or require to retire . . . or to discriminate against such
individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment.302 The LAD also provides that “[a]ll persons shall have the
opportunity to obtain employment . . . without discrimination because of . . .
age. . . . This opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.”303
The LAD does not contain a minimum age requirement, but does provide an
exception to age discrimination by allowing employers to refuse to hire a
person younger than eighteen years of age or hire or promote a person older
than seventy years of age.304
The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the issue of reverse
discrimination under the LAD in Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler.305 In
Sisler, the court held that a twenty-five-year-old employee stated a legally
sufficient claim when he alleged that he had been terminated because he was
too young to occupy the position of bank vice-president and had been replaced
with a thirty-one-year-old employee.306 Having noted that, unlike the ADEA,
the LAD does not limit the class of plaintiffs to those older than forty,307 the
court found that “the LAD’s prohibition against age discrimination is broad
enough to accommodate [a] claim of age discrimination based on youth.”308 In
an attempt to divine legislative intent behind the LAD, the court conducted an
exhaustive search of sources, including the text of the statute, legislative
history, legal commentary, and prior precedent.309 The court emphasized that,
consistent with the underlying purpose of the state anti-discrimination laws, the
LAD was to be construed liberally.310 The court determined that the intent of
New Jersey legislation was to “‘discourage the use of categories in
employment decisions which ignore the individual characteristics of particular
applicants.’”311 The court did observe, however, that the job market generally
favors younger workers, and concluded that a plaintiff alleging reverse age
discrimination “clearly bears a heavy burden in demonstrating that his

302. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (West 2002) (also listing “race, creed, color, national
origin, ancestry, . . . marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, genetic information, sex or
atypical hereditary cellular or blood trait of any individual” among the protected factors).
303. Id. at § 10:5-4 (West 2002).
304. Id. at §§ 10:5-2.1, 10:5-12(a) (West 2002).
305. 723 A.2d 944 (N.J. 1999).
306. Id. at 948, 957.
307. Id. at 952. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-2.1, 10:5-12(a) (West 2002) (LAD protects
individuals against age discrimination beginning at age eighteen.).
308. Sisler, 723 A.2d at 957.
309. Id. at 950–53.
310. Id. at 958.
311. Id. (quoting Ogden v. Bureau of Labor, 682 P.2d 802, 810 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), aff’d,
698 P.2d 189 (Or. 1985) (en banc)).
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employer had ‘some reason or inclination’ to discriminate against youthful
employees.”312
Similarly, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the state’s civil rights
act allowed a cause of action for discrimination on the basis of youth in Zanni
v. Medaphis Physician Services Corp.313 Unlike the ADEA, Michigan’s
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act covers persons eighteen years of age and
older.314 In Zanni, a thirty-one-year-old account executive claimed that she
was discriminated against because of her relative youth.315 The plaintiff
alleged that after her supervisor told her that her voice sounded too young on
the phone and that a client wanted an older account executive, she was
replaced by an older, less qualified employee.316 The court expressly relied on
the plain language of the state statute, which prohibits discrimination based on
“chronological age,” in recognizing the cause of action.317 The court found
nothing in the statute that limited its applicability to any particular age
group.318
The court noted that its holding was in line with goal of the statute, namely
“to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and
biases.”319 The court observed that the potential for younger workers to be
judged on the basis of inaccurate stereotypes exists in spite of their relative
youth.320 The court found the case law construing the ADEA inapposite for
the purposes of interpreting the state statute because the ADEA specifically
limits the protected category to individuals older than forty.321 Several other
state courts echoed the reasoning of Sisler and Zanni.322
By contrast, the Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to extend the
protection of the state anti-discrimination statute to younger employees.323 In
Rock v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, the employer

312. Id. at 960. The court found that Sisler’s allegations that the chairman of the bank was
shocked to discover his age and advised Sisler not to reveal his age to other bank officers because
he would be embarrassed if other people found out it was sufficient to establish a prima facie
showing of an “unusual” tendency to discriminate against a majority plaintiff. Id. at 959.
313. 612 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
314. MICH. COMP. L. SERV. §§ 37.2101–2804 (Lexis 2001).
315. Zanni, 612 N.W.2d at 846.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 847.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Zanni, 612 N.W.2d at 848. The court noted, “[j]ust as an older worker may be
inaccurately perceived as less energetic and resistant to new ideas, a younger worker may be
unfairly viewed as immature and unreliable, without regard for individual merits.” Id.
321. Id. at 847.
322. See, e.g., Ogden v. Bureau of Labor, 699 P.2d 189, 192 (Or. 1985) (en banc)
(interpreting the Oregon age discrimination law to allow claims by younger workers).
323. Rock v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 424 N.E.2d 244, 249 (Mass. 1981).
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offered additional early retirement benefits to employees who were older than
fifty-five.324 Employees between the ages of forty and fifty-five brought a suit
under the Massachusetts anti-discrimination law.325 The court found that
offering additional retirement benefits to older cohorts within the protected
class did not constitute unlawful discrimination.326 The court explicitly relied
on federal case law that interpreted the ADEA and stated that the “concept of a
‘protected class’ has a narrower application in age discrimination cases than in
the race or sex discrimination context.”327
The court recognized that “‘[b]ecause age is a relative rather than absolute
status when taken as a basis for discrimination, it need not follow that all
persons protected by the [ADEA] should be grouped together for purposes of
delineating the extent of their protection.’”328 The court also indicated that
“the history, language, and spirit” of the state anti-discrimination statute
mandated that the plaintiff show an injury to an expected employment
benefit—an injury that was absent in the case of additional early retirement
benefits.329 Younger employees lost no reasonably expected employee benefit,
and the legislative history of the act indicated that the statute was only
concerned with injuries to older workers resulting from a refusal to hire,
demotion, or discharge based on age.330
The review of state court decisions illuminates the important distinctions
between the ADEA and state civil rights statutes. The distinguishing feature of
the states’ age discrimination statutes, which gave rise to successful reverse
age discrimination claims, is the absence of the lower age threshold defining
the protected class. The absence of the lower age limit indicates that state
legislatures were equally concerned with the plight of young as well as older
workers. In addition, unlike the ADEA, state statutes do not contain the
numerous exceptions listed in the ADEA.331 Thus, interpreting state statutes to
prohibit consideration of age per se is in line with the blanket prohibition of
state statutes against age discrimination.
Despite the fact that state courts have been more active in the area of
reverse age discrimination, only four jurisdictions—New Jersey, Michigan,

324. Id. at 245.
325. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(1) (2000)).
326. Id. at 248.
327. Id. at 247–48.
328. Rock, 424 N.E.2d at 248 (quoting Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 F. Supp. 357,
366 (N.D. Ga. 1979)).
329. Id. at 246–47.
330. Id.
331. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.6(5) (West 2001) (exception for employees aged
forty-five and older in bona fide apprenticeship programs); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.33(2)(e)
(West 2002) (exception for hiring to a position in which knowledge and experience is required for
future advancement to a managerial or executive position).
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Maine and Oregon—have extended the states’ age discrimination protection to
younger plaintiffs.332 In addition to representing a minority view, state law
decisions do not inform interpretation of a federal statute and do not aid in the
attempt to divine congressional intent. Because there are no prohibitions
against states expanding upon the federal anti-discrimination legislation, “state
law can supplement the protection afforded under the ADEA.”333 The lack of
preemption “paves the way for influential state legislation . . . which prohibits
age discrimination without targeting a specific age group.”334 Thus, states are
free to enact laws that will permit reverse age discrimination lawsuits for
people in their forties as well as for younger workers. Considering that the
ADEA only provides “minimum standards for barring age discrimination in
employment for workers,”335 such a result would be both fair and desirable.
V. TITLE VII AND THE ADEA ANALOGY
It may seem anomalous, at first glance, to recognize reverse race and sex
discrimination claims under Title VII and to refuse a cause of action for
reverse age discrimination under the ADEA. A number of substantive
provisions of the ADEA are modeled after Title VII.336 It has also been widely
accepted that, in addition to some common language, the ADEA and Title VII
share “a common purpose: ‘the elimination of discrimination in the
workplace.’”337 Although Title VII and the ADEA share a common origin, the
two statutes diverge in many aspects, as evidenced by the text of the statutes
and their legislative histories.338

332. See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., 296 F.3d 466, 474–75 (6th Cir. 2002) (Cole, J.,
concurring).
333. See Fuhrman, supra note 15, at 600.
334. Id.
335. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967, 113 Cong. Rec. 2467
(statement of Sen. Yarborough), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 66.
336. See Roberta Sue Alexander, Comment, The Future of Disparate Impact Analysis For
Age Discrimination in a Post-Hazen Paper World, 25 U. DAYTON L. REV. 75, 87 (1999).
337. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (quoting Oscar
Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979)).
338. There is a marked disagreement among scholars whether differences and similarities
between Title VII and the ADEA warrant treating the categories protected by the statutes in the
same manner or require substantial divergence. Compare, e.g., Julie Vigil, Comment, Expanding
the Hostile Environment Theory to Cover Age Discrimination: How Far is Too Far?, 23 PEPP. L.
REV. 565, 592 (1996) (finding no support for treating the two statutes differently), with Pontz,
supra note 237, at 310–314 (taking the position that the disparate impact theory available under
Title VII should not be extended to claims under the ADEA). This Note does not attempt to
resolve the conflicting points of view. The author’s only contention is that for the purposes of
recognizing a cause of action for reverse age discrimination, the two statutes cannot and should
not be equated.
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The ADEA was enacted as an independent statute, rather than an
amendment to Title VII. Apart from the ADEA’s narrower objectives, other
characteristics distinguish it from Title VII. “Unlike Title VII, which provides
equal protection from discrimination for men and women, blacks and whites,
and so on, the ADEA extends only to individuals over the age of [forty].”339
Some legal scholars suggest that this distinction may imply that a “protected
age group” in fact translates into preferential treatment and creates a privileged
class of citizens.340 Without challenging the propriety of conclusions about the
“rent-seeking” behavior of senior citizens, it remains a fact that the framers of
the ADEA sought to protect only older adults.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins indicates that
the substantive analysis of age discrimination claims under the ADEA should
be distinct from the principles underlying Title VII claims.341 The central issue
in Hazen Paper was the relationship between age discrimination and seniority
systems.342 The Court ruled that there was no cause of action under the ADEA
“when the factor motivating the employer is some feature other than the
employee’s age.”343 The Court found that the use of factors that correlated
with age was acceptable under the ADEA.344
In Hazen Paper, Justice O’Connor stated that “[i]t is the very essence of
age discrimination for an older employee to be fired because the employer
believes that productivity and competence decline with old age.”345 Justice
O’Connor further noted that in enacting the ADEA, Congress sought to
eliminate the use of “inaccurate and denigrating generalization[s] about
339. Clint Bolick, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Equal Opportunity or Reverse
Discrimination?, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS No. 82 (1987), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pa/pa082.html.
340. See id. (arguing that the ADEA has been transformed into an artificial advantage for the
elderly in violation of the principal of equal opportunity and economic liberty); Issacharoff &
Harris, supra note 77, passim (opining that the ADEA amendments forced the transfer of wealth
to the least deserving group of society); Rutherglen, supra note 259, at 521 (finding that the
ADEA has lost its justification because the primary beneficiaries are not a historically
disadvantaged group).
341. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). See H. Lane Dennard, Jr. & Kendall L. Kelly, Price Waterhouse:
Alive and Well Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 51 MERCER L. REV. 721, 744
(2000) (noting that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hazen Paper and Kimel v. Florida Board Of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), set the ADEA apart from Title VII).
342. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 608.
343. Id. at 609.
344. Id. at 611–12.
345. Id. at 610. AARP contends that, “[b]ased on this comment[,] an alarming number of
federal circuit and district courts have held that [the] ADEA only prohibits discrimination based
on inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes about older workers.” AARP, THE POLICY BOOK:
AARP PUBLIC POLICIES 2002 4–5 (2002), available at http://www.aarp.org/ppa/ch4.pdf. “Even
more troubling,” says AARP, is that “the courts are requiring age discrimination victims to
produce evidence that such stereotypes were operative.” Id.
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age,”346 and that “‘age discrimination rarely [is] based on the sort of animus
motivating some other forms of discrimination.’”347 In addition to reiterating
the “older employee” standard for application of the ADEA, the Hazen Paper
Court dismissed the idea that the principles of Title VII application could be
directly imported into the ADEA.348 In light of the difference in rationale of
the ADEA and Title VII, the majority opinion refused to rule on whether the
disparate impact theory of liability should be extended to age.349 The
concurrence explicitly acknowledged that there were “substantial arguments
that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the
ADEA.”350
Some critics view Hazen Paper as narrowing the scope of and eroding the
application of the ADEA.351 Others applaud the Hazen Paper Court for
recognizing the differences inherent in discrimination against various protected
groups and, specifically, in differentiating between “impermissible
stereotyping” and “valid economic generalizations.”352 Hazen Paper has been
widely criticized by the proponents of disparate impact analysis under the
ADEA.353 One of the criticisms centers on the Hazen Paper decision running
contrary to the doctrine of in pari materia which posits that “the interpretation
of one statute ‘may be influenced by language of other statutes which are not
specifically related, but which apply to similar persons, things, or
relationships.’”354 The very definition of the doctrine of in pari materia belies
its application in the context of reverse discrimination.355 The similarity of
persons or relationships is precisely what is missing from ADEA and Title VII.

346. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610.
347. Id. at 612 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231 (1983)).
348. See, e.g., Brendan Sweeney, Comment, “Downsizing” the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: the Availability of Disparate Impact Liability, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1527, 1558
(1996); DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 733 n.20 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that
Hazen Paper disposes of the assumption “that interpretations of the ADEA parallel
interpretations of Title VII”).
349. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610.
350. Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
351. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 336, at 107–08.
352. See Michael J. Van Sistine & Bruce Meredith, The Legality of Early Retirement
Incentive Plans: Can Quantum Physics Help Resolve the Current Uncertainty?, 84 MARQ. L.
REV. 587, 634 (2001).
353. E.g., Alexander, supra note 336, at 88–92 (arguing that statutory language, history, and
policy considerations support employing the same analytical approach to the two statutes).
354. See id. at 88 (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees v. Dep’t of Interior, 526 U.S. 86
(1999)).
355. In pari materia is translated from Latin as “in the same matter.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 794 (7th ed. 1999). “It is a canon of construction that statutes that are in pari
materia may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by
looking at another statute on the same subject.” Id.
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The idea that the principles of Title VII application cannot be transferable
in all their particulars to the ADEA is especially relevant in the context of
reverse discrimination.
The lack of symmetry in the application of
discrimination principles in the context of age is in line with the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Hazen Paper.
A.

Immutability

In addition to the differences in the statutory language and the histories of
the ADEA and Title VII, the cause of action for reverse discrimination should
not be recognized under the ADEA because of substantive differences between
the characteristics that the two statutes seek to protect. Unlike race, sex,
national origin and, to some extent, religion, age is not a fixed and immutable
characteristic. A trait is immutable when an “individual has little or no control
over it,”356 and has sometimes been defined as the inability of individuals to
enter or leave a particular group.357 While an alien can eventually move out of
his or her group by acquiring citizenship, or a Democrat or Republican may
change political affiliation, presumably no such choice is available to people of
a certain race, sex, or national origin.358 Immutability is important in the
context of discrimination because individuals in groups such as race, sex, and
national origin who possess immutable characteristics cannot ever leave their
group, are more vulnerable, and thus require more protection.359
Unlike race or sex, age represents a continuum and an inevitable guarantee
that, in the normal course of events, all of us will age. As such, age is not
immutable.360 The main feature that sets it apart from race or sex is that at
some point every member of society will join this presumably disadvantaged
group.361 If not yet associated with the social group of the elderly, most of the
younger people have family members in the older cohorts. Therefore,
mutability serves as a safeguard from potentially rampant abuse, which is more
likely to occur against a group with which the abuser has neither immediate
nor potential affiliation.362

356. Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV.
107, 147 (1990).
357. See Van Sistine & Meredith, supra note 352, at 609.
358. See Simon, supra note 356, at 147–49.
359. See id. at 149; Van Sistine & Meredith, supra note 352, at 609.
360. Some critics have argued that age is immutable in one sense but not in another. See
Simon, supra note 356, at 148 (stating that age is immutable because “one can never grow
younger,” yet not immutable because “no one is fixed at a particular age”).
361. See Van Sistine & Meredith, supra note 352, at 610.
362. See id.
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Thus, age is unique among other characteristics protected by
antidiscrimination laws because it is not immutable.363 This realization
requires that age be treated differently from other “prototypical” groups
protected by the classic age-discrimination theory.364 Numerous distinctions
between age and race or sex have led some scholars to conclude that “separate
models must be used to determine the legality of age-based distinctions
depending upon the context in which the distinctions are made.”365 Van
Sistine and Meredith argue that in some situations older people are subject to
the same type of stereotyping and arbitrary discrimination as AfricanAmericans, while in other situations the different treatment is based on valid
generalizations about age.366 They cite ERIPs as an example of the latter
situation because an ERIP is a “valuable benefit” rather than an “adverse
treatment based on prejudice.”367 ERIPs are premised on “the employer’s
desire to save money” and to increase older workers’ retirement options.368
Relying on the text of OWBPA and the ADEA’s congressional history, the
authors conclude that age distinctions within a voluntary ERIP should not be
viewed as evidence of discrimination.369
The logic of Van Sistine and Meredith’s analysis can be extended to other
benefits made available to older cohorts within the protected class. Because of
the differences between the protected categories and the fact that the ADEA is
a limited legislative remedy, it is best to analyze the phenomenon of reverse
age discrimination using a more pragmatic and flexible approach. Recognizing
that a more favorable treatment of the older workers within the protected class
does not constitute discrimination in the classic sense, is part and parcel of
such an approach.
B.

Age versus Race and Sex Discrimination in the Constitutional Context

The difference in the doctrinal underpinnings of race and sex
discrimination is underscored by the different treatment afforded to race and
sex discrimination by the Supreme Court in equal protection cases.370 Despite

363. Arguably, disability also shares non-immutable characteristics because anyone is
potentially subject to disability. However, unlike aging, disability does not, in the normal course
of events, occur to every person, but affects only a percentage of the population.
364. Van Sistine & Meredith, supra note 352, at 598.
365. Id. at 596. The authors further argue that the “classical discrimination theory simply
does not provide one overarching principle by which all age distinctions can be judged” and
suggest that ERIPs should not trigger classical discrimination scrutiny. Id. at 596, 655.
366. Id. at 614.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Van Sistine & Meredith, supra note 352, at 642–43, 655.
370. See Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going With Gilmer?—Some Ruminations
on the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 203, 224 (1992)
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the fact that the constitutional body of law is distinct and separate from case
law under anti-discriminatory statutes, it is a well-suited source for reviewing
the difference in treatment of age and other categories. What makes the
Supreme Court’s equal protection decisions particularly relevant is that they
“represent the most developed body of theory” providing conceptual
justifications for why specific groups require protection.371
While race is considered a suspect classification and requires strict scrutiny
by the courts,372 gender is termed a “semi-suspect” classification with attendant
intermediate scrutiny,373 and age enjoys no suspect classification and
commands only rational-basis review.374 A classic example is the Supreme
Court’s comparison of race and age in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia.375 In Murgia, the Court sustained the rationality standard in
evaluating mandatory retirement law for state police officers.376
The Murgia Court advanced several arguments in support of its different
treatment of age as opposed to race or national origin. First, the older workers
have not experienced a “‘history of purposeful unequal treatment’” by the
government.377 Second, the older workers have not experienced bias because
of “stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.”378 Third,
the Court did not see the aged as a “‘discrete and insular group’ in need of
‘extraordinary protection.’”379 Finally, the Court acknowledged that, unlike an
immutable characteristic such as race, age does ultimately affect a person’s

(acknowledging that in the constitutional context, the courts consider age discrimination to be
“less loathsome than race discrimination”).
371. Van Sistine & Meredith, supra note 352, at 600-01; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976) (noting that “in the case of defining the term ‘discrimination,’ which
Congress has nowhere in Title VII defined, those cases afford an existing body of law analyzing
and discussing that term in a legal context not wholly dissimilar to the concerns which Congress
manifested in enacting Title VII”).
372. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995) (racial and ethnical distinctions are
inherently suspect); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (noting that
laws classifying citizens on the basis of race cannot be upheld under strict scrutiny unless
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest).
373. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). The court stated that
the party seeking to defend gender classifications must demonstrate “that the classification serves
‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’ are
‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’” Id. (quotations omitted).
374. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (reasoning that “[o]ld age . . .
does not define a discrete and insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal
life spans, will experience it”).
375. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
376. Id. at 312.
377. Id. at 313 (quoting San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
378. Id.
379. Id. (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938)).
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ability to work.380 Applying rational basis scrutiny, the Court had no trouble
concluding that mandatory retirement at fifty was constitutional because it
removed from police service those whose fitness “presumptively . . .
diminished with age.”381 Other decisions have echoed the Court’s reasoning in
Murgia.382
In summary, the Supreme Court has recognized the fundamental
differences between age and other protected categories and ultimately has
refused to treat age classifications as suspect. The Supreme Court’s approach
to age classifications thus supports the conclusion that the ADEA protection
does not need to be harmonized with Title VII and may run “one way.”
VI. SOCIAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In his concurring opinion in Cline, Judge Cole cited Congress’s finding
that “all age discrimination burdens commerce” in support of his opinion that
recognizing claims for “reverse discrimination suits would alleviate the
congressionally identified burden on commerce.”383 Judge Cole’s comment is
ironic in light of the costs that commerce will ultimately have to absorb as a
result of reverse discrimination suits under the ADEA. The effects of
recognizing a cause of action for reverse age discrimination are potentially farreaching. The dissent in Cline expressed its concern that it would open the
floodgates to litigation attacking benefits to older individuals if the reverse
discrimination claims are permitted.384 The Equal Employment Advisory
Council (“EEAC”) views Cline as “vastly . . . expand[ing] the number of
employment actions potentially subject to challenge under the ADEA.”385 By
failing to read the central prohibition of the ADEA in the context of other
statutory provisions and relevant legislative history, the Cline court gave the
ADEA “‘a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying
380. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 315. As an Equal Protection Clause case, Murgia focused on the
absence of evidence of the states discriminating on the basis of age. Many of the statements
regarding age in Murgia appear contrary to the congressional findings in the ADEA. The Murgia
analogy is only used in this Note to underscore the difference in the interpretation of the ADEA
and Title VII by the Supreme Court. The implications of the distinctions between race and age
discrimination “need not be identical in the constitutional and statutory contexts.” Note, The Age
Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380, 387 (1976).
381. Id. at 315–16.
382. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (underscoring the
differences in rationales and remedial schemes of the ADEA and Title VII). In Kimel, the
Supreme Court held that rational basis scrutiny was an appropriate measure of evaluating statesponsored discrimination against older workers under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
383. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 474 (6th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted, 123 S.Ct. 1786 (2003) (Cole, J., concurring).
384. See id. at 476 (Williams, J., dissenting).
385. E-mail from Robert E. Williams, Attorney, Equal Employment Advisory Council, to
Author (Oct. 15, 2002, 09:07:33 CST) (on file with author).
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words.’”386 In light of the continuous graying of America, if the ADEA is
viewed as a symmetrical legislation, the claims of “youth” discrimination
within the protected class will grow exponentially.387
The cause of action for reverse age discrimination has the potential effect
of invalidating any retirement policy program that distinguishes between
employees based on age. The business community perceives “a serious
problem for any employer that establishes a minimum eligibility age for retiree
health insurance benefits[,] or indeed, for any benefit other than a pension.”388
The challenged practices may include severance pay as well as medical and
life insurance made available to older employees during such events as
reductions-in-force or negotiated contracts with unions. Other practices, such
as varying the amount of benefits in favor of older employees or using
premiums paid by younger workers to subsidize the cost of insurance of older
employees,389 will also be threatened if the Cline decision is allowed to stand.
The Cline decision is likely to have the most direct negative impact on the
health benefits offered to retirees.390 Presently, “[m]ore than one-third of
seniors—almost fourteen million people on Medicare—receive health
insurance” through employment.391 Employers typically require that the
covered employees meet the combination of age and service requirements,
with the most prevalent minimum age being fifty-five.392 Because of the
prohibitive costs of insurance premiums, which were estimated to rise sixteen
percent in the year 2002,393 many employers have already scaled back the

386. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 408 (1999) (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995); see also Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)
(denouncing interpretations that give “unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress”).
387. It is estimated that by 2004, more than half of the American workforce will be in the age
group protected by the ADEA. Pontz, supra note 237, at 270 n.19.
388. E-mail from Robert E. Williams, Attorney, Equal Employment Advisory Council, to
Author (Oct. 15, 2002, 09:07:33 CST) (on file with author); see 29 U.S.C. § 623(l)(1)(A) (2000)
(permitting a minimum age threshold for pension plans).
389. Brief of the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at *4–*9, Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 123 S.
Ct. 1786 (2003) (No. 02-1080), available at 2003 WL 21649487.
390. See Brief of the ERISA Industry Committee as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 246, at *19.
391. New Survey Shows Retiree Health Benefits Continue to Decline, at 1, at
http://www.cmwf.org/media/releases/gabel506%5Frelease04152002.html (last modified April 15,
2002).
392. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION AND HEWITT ASSOC., The Current State of
Retiree Health Benefits: Findings from the Kaiser/Hewitt 2002 Retiree Health Survey, at 2
(2002), available at http://www.kff.org/content /2002/3251/3251.pdf.
393. Adam Marcus, Cost of Retiree Benefits Rising, at http://www.hon.ch/News/HSN/
510678.html (Dec. 5, 2002).
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health coverage that they offer.394 The provision of enhanced health benefits to
older employees is voluntary on the part of the employers and not mandated by
law.395 If the employers are threatened with the possibility of lawsuits for
reverse age discrimination because of their inability to provide health benefits
for the younger employees in the ADEA-protected class, they are likely to
decline offering any health benefits to retirees. Instead of encouraging a
socially-beneficial practice that helps meet the congressional concern for older
workers, the Cline holding provides a perverse incentive to the employer and
encourages the employer not to provide any benefits at all.396
Recognizing a cause of action for reverse age discrimination also poses a
substantial threat to the collective bargaining process. In 2001, 13.4% or
approximately 16.4 million wage and salary workers were union members.397
These workers had median weekly earnings of $718, as compared to a median
of $575 for workers who were not represented by unions.398 The economic
well-being of union workers and their families will be threatened if collective
bargaining agreements are allowed to be undermined by claims of reverse
discrimination. The concern of the dissent in Cline about the impact of the
Cline decision on the stability of labor relations is well-taken. Because of the
shadow cast by the Sixth Circuit on all types of benefits that use age as a
criterion for determining eligibility, employers, unions, and the collective
bargaining process itself will suffer because negotiated agreements may
become subject to a new level of judicial scrutiny.

394. See Bruce Stuart et al., Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance and Prescription Drug
Coverage For New Retirees: Dramatic Declines in Five Years, at W3–334 (July 23, 2003)
(stating that “the number of large employers (500 employees or more) offering coverage to
Medicare-eligible retirees declined from 57 percent in 1987 to 23 percent in 2001”), available at
http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/Stuart_Web_Excl_072303.htm. The decline in the
number of retirees covered was accompanied by “reduced benefits or increased employees’ share
of premiums, or both.” Id.
395. See Pamela Perun, Phased Retirement Programs for the Twenty-First Century
Workplace, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 633, 635 (2002) (noting that “[n]othing in ERISA or the
[tax] [c]ode requires employers to establish benefit plans or mandates the types of benefits those
plans must offer”).
396. Even the AARP expressed fear that in the current economic slump, the employers,
fearing a lawsuit and attempting to cut costs, will decide not to provide retirement benefits to any
workers older than 40. See Andrew Brownstein, ‘Younger’ Workers Can Sue Under the ADEA,
Sixth Circuit Finds, 38 TRIAL 82, 82 (Oct. 2002) (interviewing Tom Osborne, senior attorney for
the AARP).
397. News Release, Bureau of Labor and Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members
Summary, Feb. 25, 2003, at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm
398. Id. The Department of Labor noted that “[t]he difference [in wages] reflects a variety of
influences in addition to coverage by a collective bargaining agreement.” Id. Undoubtedly,
however, the superior wages are correlated with the union representation.
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The ADEA, like other employment discrimination statutes, does not
exempt the terms of collective bargaining agreements from its reach.399
However, the courts have recognized the importance of collective bargaining
and have demonstrated judicial respect towards such agreements in a variety of
cases dealing with employment discrimination. For example, in the context of
Title VII, the Supreme Court ruled in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison
that an employer was not required to make an exception to seniority rules that
determined shift assignments in order to accommodate an employee’s religious
observance.400 The Court emphasized the importance of collective bargaining
and the seniority rights obtained through such bargaining: “Collective
bargaining, aimed at effecting workable and enforceable agreements between
management and labor, lies at the core of our national labor policy.”401
In the end, it will be society at large that will ultimately pay for reverse
discrimination lawsuits. While offering the entire range of benefits to all
workers older than forty will likely be cost-prohibitive to employers, the only
alternative left for them would be to deny the benefits altogether. Unlike in the
context of race and sex, this action will affect every member of the society if
not immediately, then later in life either directly or through aging parents and
other family members. As the dissent in Cline deftly noted, the needs of older
people increase with age,402 and it stands to reason that older individuals
require greater protection. “Pension, and medical and life insurance plans must
take account of age, if only because life expectancy and health decrease as age

399. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 630(a), (d) (2000) (specifically listing “labor organizations” as one
type of covered entity subject to its provisions).
400. 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977).
401. Id. In the context of the ADA, the Supreme Court has recently addressed the interaction
between a “reasonable accommodation” and a bona fide seniority system in US Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett. 535 U.S. 391 (2002). While the seniority system at issue in Barnett was not a
collectively-bargained system, but rather a system unilaterally imposed by management, the
Court relied on cases that involved seniority systems negotiated under the collective bargaining
agreement. See id. at 403–404 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 at 7980; Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999); Eckles v. Consol. Rail
Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1047–48 (7th Cir. 1996); Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir. 1989);
Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir. 1987)). The Supreme Court in Barnett held that the
“reasonable accommodation” standard does not ordinarily compel the employer to violate
provisions of a seniority system in order to permit the job transfer of a disabled employee. See id.
at 393-94. Nevertheless, the Court made clear that an employee may “present evidence of special
circumstances” that warrants a finding that an accommodation is reasonable despite its impact on
a seniority system. Id. at 394. Similarly, case law has recognized that collectively-bargained
seniority trumps the need for accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. §§
791, 793–94 (2000). The Seventh Circuit, for example, was willing to uphold a collective
bargaining agreement when the rights of the protected class were negatively affected. Eckles, 94
F.3d at 1051–52.
402. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 269 F.3d. 466, 476 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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increases.”403 Finally, as noted by the concurrence in Cline, there is something
inherently counterintuitive about prohibiting a preferential policy toward older
members of the protected group.404 The entire concept of setting the “younger
old” against the “older old” appears bizarre and objectionable.405
VII. CONCLUSION
The argument that reverse age discrimination is actionable under the
ADEA, while plausible, is not convincing.
The strongest clues to
congressional understanding of the nature of the protection offered by the
ADEA are found not only in the text of the ADEA’s central prohibition but
also in the context of the entire statute and its legislative history. The multiple
references in the ADEA to “older” adults, as well as the statute’s stated
purpose of eradicating only arbitrary discrimination in employment,
underscore the fact that the blanket prohibition of employment discrimination
on the basis of age was not the intent of Congress.
The ADEA exceptions, especially those concerning seniority and ERIPs,
exemplify Congress’s recognition that age, unlike race or sex, must be taken
into account in certain circumstances. Legislative history, while not explicit on
the subject, also supports the view that protection of the younger workers was
not the goal of the ADEA’s framers. Legislative and judicial recognition of
age as being profoundly different from other categories that require protection
lends credence to the conclusion that the interpretation of the ADEA should be
treated differently from Title VII.
While the ADEA provides minimum standards for combating age
discrimination in employment, younger workers are not left without recourse
because states are free to enact statutes that will offer symmetrical protection.
The economic and social ramifications of allowing reverse age discrimination
claims cannot be overstated. Fearing a potential ADEA lawsuit, employers
will be hesitant to offer increased benefits to older workers. Such a result
would frustrate, not serve, Congress’s end. Therefore, the Supreme Court will
need to cure the circuit split created by Cline and should do so by overruling
Cline.
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403. Rutherglen, supra note 259, at 498.
404. See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of Judge Cole’s concurrence in Cline.
405. The senior attorney for the AARP, while acknowledging that the AARP has never in the
past taken the side of the employer, called the idea “distasteful.” See Brownstein, supra note 396,
at 82.
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